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ABSTRACT 
 
A number of studies in the prior literature have found a link between cash flow and firm 
investment [Hubbard (1998) and cites therein].  Findings of most of these studies have the caveat 
that cash flow could simply be capturing expectations of future profitability because the 
empirical proxy (typically a version of average Q or market to book ratio) for marginal Q is 
imperfect.  This study removes this caveat while retaining the Fazarri, Hubbard and Petersen’s 
(1988) a-priori sorting of firms into liquidity constrained and non-liquidity constrained 
regression framework.    
This study focuses on inventory investments of two sets of Indian manufacturing firms: 
issuers and non-issuers of short-term arm’s length debt during 1996-97, a time period of robust 
economic growth and simultaneously an inward shift in the supply of bank loans instituted by the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI).  Non-issuer firms have significantly higher investment-liquidity 
sensitivities vis-à-vis issuer firms for inventory investments in 1996-97.  Issuer and non-issuer 
firms investing less than their internal funds have no differences in liquidity coefficients while 
firms investing more than their internal funds do.  Issuer and non-issuer firms that do not face an 
increase in the cost of external debt (ergo not an increase in inferred external and internal cost of 
funds wedge) have no differences in liquidity coefficients while the two set of firms that face an 
increase do. Differences in investment-liquidity sensitivities between the two set of firms arise 
from their differences in bank dependence and hypotheses including pure bank dependence, 
priority lending and loans above banks’ rule for estimating a firm’s debt capacity find empirical 
support.  Bank characteristics based hypotheses including single banking relationship and weak 
banks with below Basle capital standards cannot explain differences in liquidity constraints.   
Alternative explanations including agency problems, the flypaper effect, over-investment, legal 
regimes of parent companies and crony capitalism do not find empirical support.  Debt overhang 
hypothesis is supported by the data.  The findings are consistent with Almeida, Campello and 
Weisbach (2002) and represent differences in liquidity demand by firms explaining differences 
in liquidity constraints between issuers and non-issuers.  Relatively pristine sub-sample of new 
short-term public debt issuers in 1996-97 (who were non-issuers till 1996), sub-sample of 
potentially ‘misclassified’ liquidity constrained non-issuers firms and a holdout sample of 
government owned firms that have access to state budgetary support provide results consistent 
with differences in liquidity constraints between issuers and non-issuers.  Propensity score 
regressions match issuer and non-issuer firms on three dimensions: Q, net profit and age of the 
firm.  In 4 out of 5 blocks the liquidity coefficient of non-issuer firms is higher than that of issuer 
firms.  The results confirm that non-issuer firms face higher liquidity constraints and that the 
differences in liquidity coefficients are not subject to the caveat that firm characteristics, 
differences in mismeasurement of Q or differences in expectations of future firm profitability 
between issuers and non-issuers.  In sum, relative differences in inventories investment-liquidity 
sensitivities represent differences in liquidity constraints.  Empirical evidence is consistent with a 
causal link between differences in liquidity constraints and RBI’s regulatory fiat in 1996-97.  
The allocation of bank debt during 1996-97 is not consistent with maximizing economic 
efficiency measured by either ratio of value added to capital or ratio of operating profits to 
capital. Results from examining components of inventories: raw materials, work-in-process and 
finished goods are not supportive of differences in investment liquidity sensitivities between 
issuers and non-issuers. 
Differences in investment liquidity sensitivities between issuer and non-issuer firms in 
capital investments and total firm investments regressions provide support for the findings that 
the investment liquidity sensitivities documented earlier represent liquidity constraints driven by 
bank dependence.  However, using propensity scores to match issuers and non-issuers on 
profitability, Q and age of the firm the results on capital investments and total firm investments 
are consistent with the differences in liquidity coefficients being potentially driven by differences   2
in the mismeasurement of Q or that non-issuer firms are less liquidity constrained than issuer 
firms.   
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
  
 
  Blinder and Maccini (1991) document that, in post-World War II recessions, declines in 
inventory investments account for an average of 87 percent of the peak to through movements in 
United States GNP.
1  Guasch and Kogan (2001) using macro-level data find in their sample of 52 
countries levels of inventory investments of manufacturing firms in developing countries are 
substantially higher than those in the U.S.  Therefore examining inventory investments at a 
micro-level is an important question and inventory investments are an important sub-set of firm 
investments in an emerging market.  In the fiscal year 1996-97, this study focuses on inventory 
investments of two sets of Indian manufacturing firms a priori expected to face differing levels 
of information asymmetries and having differential access to capital markets.  For this study’s 
sample of Indian manufacturing firms inventory investment is an important sub-set of firm 
investments and the mean (median) level of inventories scaled by total assets for issuers is 0.199 
(0.18) and for non-issuers is 0.175 (0.154) [Table 1].  The link between financing constraints and 
investments is an important research question reflected by the number of studies in corporate 
finance, macro-economics, public economics and industrial organization that focus on it [See 
Hubbard (1998) for a comprehensive review of this literature].   A number of these prior studies 
based on Tobin’s Q framework and testing the neo-classical model of corporate investment are 
subject to the caveat that liquidity captures future expectations of firm profitability that are due 
to mismeasurement of Q.  For studies following the Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (FHP, 1988) 
methodology the critique is equally valid if empirical measures of Q perform worse for certain 
classes of firms (typically firms a-priori sorted as constrained firms) relative to other classes of 
                                                 
1 Ramey and West (1997) provide a detailed review of the prior studies in this literature.   3
firms (typically firms a-priori sorted as unconstrained firms).  We remove this caveat while 
retaining the FHP methodology by using propensity score regressions that match a-priori sorted 
constrained and unconstrained firms on firm dimensions that are related to potential differences 
in mismeasurement of Q.  By examining only the sub-set of constrained and unconstrained firms 
that match on these multiple dimensions, we can provide robust evidence on the relation between 
corporate investments: inventories, capital and total firm investments, and liquidity.               
Kaplan and Zingales (2000) re-examine the sample of FHP (1988) focusing on capital 
investments in FHP’s constrained sub-sample and note that a number of those firms could have 
invested more in a year if they wanted to.  FHP (2000) recommends that the correct comparison 
is whether those firms could have increased their total investments or not?  Given the agreement 
on the importance of a financing gap (i.e. difference between total investments and liquidity) by 
both these sets of authors, it is surprising that no study has reported a formal hypothesis test of 
this issue till date.  We make this criterion operational in cross-sectional regressions and confirm 
that issuers and non-issuers that invest less than their liquidity have no differences in liquidity 
coefficients while firms investing more than their liquidity have differences.    
  Further, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) re-examine the entire methodology pioneered by 
FHP (1988) and present evidence that suggests that differences in investment-liquidity 
sensitivities across two sets of firms sorted by an a priori measure of access to capital markets 
and information asymmetries cannot necessarily be interpreted as evidence that one set of firms 
is more liquidity constrained than the other.  Kaplan and Zingales (2000) also note that an 
important question is if differences in investment liquidity sensitivities do not reflect differences 
in liquidity constraints then what causes these differences in investment-liquidity sensitivities?  
To address the first concern, we argue that to interpret the relative differences in liquidity 
coefficients as differences in liquidity constraints between two sets of firms sorted by an a priori 
measure of access to capital markets and information asymmetries they should reflect (and more 
importantly be seen to reflect) differences in the wedge between external and internal cost of   4
funds.  Issuers and non-issuers that do not face an increase in cost of new external debt (ergo not 
an increase in inferred wedge between external and internal cost of funds) have no differences in 
liquidity constraints while the two set of firms that face an increase in cost of external funds have 
differences.   
In response to the second concern, alternative hypotheses that could explain differences 
in liquidity constraints are examined.  Kaplan and Zingales (2000), Cleary (1999), Kadapakkam, 
Kumar and Riddick (1998) and Hennessy and Levy (2002) have put forth various potential 
answers to this question i.e. alternative explanations to explain differences in investment 
liquidity sensitivities across firms.  The alternative explanations include differences in agency 
problems, the flypaper effect, over-investment, differences in legal contracting environment, 
crony capitalism.  We examine these explanations and explanations based on financial 
intermediation i.e. bank dependence, priority lending, loans above bank loan limit rules, single 
banking relationships and weak bank health explanation in this study.    
   To do so, we take advantage of a natural economic experiment.  1996-97 was a time 
period of overall robust economic growth in India but simultaneously Reserve Bank of India 
(RBI) instituted a policy of (and engineered a) contraction of bank loans supply to the total 
commercial sector in India. Among the Indian manufacturing firms in 1996-97 one set of firms 
had access to short-term arm’s length debt markets and the other set did not.   
The results from this study are simple and straightforward to summarize.  By examining 
the bank dependence hypotheses within the two sets of firms with differential access to the short-
term arm’s length debt markets, we find results consistent with the differences in liquidity 
sensitivities reflecting differences in liquidity constraints driven by differences in bank 
dependence.  Findings of bank dependency could potentially by driven not by the firms but by 
characteristics of the banks themselves i.e. differences in bank health and single versus multiple 
banking relationships [Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia, (2002) and Sharpe (1990)].  These 
explanations do not find empirical support.  Alternative explanations based on agency problems,   5
over-investment, non-Indian legal regime through foreign parent companies and crony capitalism 
does not explain differences in liquidity constraints.   The flypaper effect explains differences in 
liquidity coefficients but the firms with above industry-adjusted liquidity are less liquidity 
constrained i.e. flypaper effect is not present.   Rather it is firms with valuable investment 
opportunities i.e. above industry-adjusted liquidity that have higher liquidity coefficients 
reflecting higher liquidity constraints.  The alternative explanation based on debt overhang 
explains differences in liquidity constraints.  Non-issuer firms have higher liquidity coefficients 
relative to issuer firms. These findings are consistent with differences in liquidity constraints 
representing differences in corporate demand for liquidity.  Propensity score regressions (that 
control for differences in firm characteristics that impact differences in expectations of future 
profitability and mismeasurement of Q problems), results confirm differences in liquidity 
constraints between issuers and non-issuers.  A caveat to these results is provided by non-issuer 
firms that are potentially ‘misclassified’ as liquidity constrained, this is the large sample cross-
sectional equivalent of the Hewlett Packard case that Kaplan and Zingales (1988) note in their 
study.     
 After finding empirical results consistent with inventory investment liquidity sensitivities 
representing liquidity constraints three question still remain.  Do the differences in liquidity 
constraints reflect differences in overall firm financial constraints?  This question can be split 
into two parts.  First part is are the firms identified as facing higher liquidity constraints for 
inventory investments (non-issuer firms) facing higher liquidity constraints in overall total firm 
investments?  Second part, are the firms identified as facing higher liquidity constraints for 
inventory investments (non-issuer firms) also facing higher liquidity constraints in capital 
investments?  Or is their higher inventory investment liquidity sensitivities a result of 
systematically higher opportunity costs of forgoing capital investments vis-à-vis inventory   6
investments such that non-issuers firms (which have higher sales growth rates) choose to bear 
higher liquidity constraints in their inventory investments at the margin.
2   
  Second question, are the differences in liquidity constraints affecting inventory 
investments between the two set of firms in 1996-97 a result of RBI’s policy of contraction of 
bank loan supply?  If yes, is the allocation of bank debt across firms efficient?  Third question, 
do the differences in investment-liquidity sensitivities in aggregate inventory investments reflect 
differences in investment liquidity sensitivities within individual components of inventories and 
are these differences homogenous across various inventory components?  
  Firms are sorted on an a priori measure of differences in information asymmetries and 
differential access to capital markets i.e. issuers of short-term arm’s length debt and non-issuers 
of short-term arm’s length debt.  Non-issuer firms face higher liquidity constraints relative to 
issuer firms across all three investments i.e. inventories, capital and total investments in ordinary 
regressions.  However, when propensity score regressions (that control for differences in 
mismeasurement of Q between issuers and non-issuers problem), the results are reversed.  Non-
issuer firms face lower liquidity constraints as compared to issuer firms.  When inventories are 
desegregated into individual components of raw materials, work-in-process and finished goods 
the results are not consistent with non-issuer firms facing higher liquidity constraints.   
A causal connection between RBI’s policy of constraining bank loans supply and the 
bank dependence based explanation for differences in investment liquidity constraints receives 
support in the data.  In the prior fiscal year 1995-96, issuer and non-issuer firms face lower and 
insignificant liquidity constraints relative to 1996-97.  However in the subsequent fiscal year 
1997-98 non-issuer firms face higher liquidity constraints relative to 1996-97.   The allocation of 
bank debt during 1996-97 is not consistent with maximizing the economic efficiency of capital 
                                                 
2 Alternatively the higher investment liquidity sensitivities of non-issuer firms could reflect their having 
systematically higher valued call options to delay capital investments.         7
employed as measured by value added to capital or operating profits to capital employed 
criterion.      
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the monetary 
conditions prevailing in India during 1996-97.  Section 3 enumerates the data and presents the 
hypotheses tested.  Section 4 provides the empirical results.  Section 5 concludes.     
 
2.  Indian Monetary Conditions In 1996-97 
 
 
  The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), in its 1996-97 annual report (p. 50) states “The 
pressure of high liquidity necessitated active liquidity management.”  RBI, in order to contain 
potential inflation, reduced by regulatory fiat the total bank credit available to the commercial 
sector in India its fiscal year 1996-97.  This contraction in total bank loans makes 1996-97 a 
natural setting to examine the impact of access to bank financing on the inventory investment 
behavior of firms.  RBI notes in its annual report for 1996-97 that, “Thus the total flow of funds 
from banks to the commercial sector amounted to rupees 346,560 million as compared with 
rupees 447,750 million in 1995-96.  Besides, the commercial sector received funds from ‘other’ 
sources, viz. bills rediscounted by banks with financial institutions, capital issues, Global 
Depositary Receipt issues, funds from foreign currency convertible bonds and borrowing from 
financial institutions.  Together with these sources, funds flow to commercial sector was rupees 
984,760 million in 1996-97 compared with rupees 1,077,930 million in 1995-96 (pg. 51).”  This 
implies that even if we take a conservative assumption of no growth of total funds needed by the 
commercial sector from 1995-96 i.e. the financing needs were constant; the decrease in the total 
funds available to the commercial sector was of the order of roughly 92 percent of the bank loan 
supply cut engineered by RBI i.e. increases in other sources of financing could not make up for 
the shortfall in bank financing available to Indian firms.      
  While the total amount of bank loans available to the commercial sector was reduced in 
1996-97, the overall Indian economy was in an expansionary mode.  The Reserve Bank of India   8
in its annual report for 1996-97 on page 38 notes that, “The overall economic activity during the 
fiscal year 1996-97, as reflected in the growth of real gross domestic product (GDP), continued 
to be distinctly higher than the trend rate of growth recorded during the past decade and a half 
beginning with 1980-81.  The initial estimate that the growth in the real GDP would be 6.8 
percent in 1996-97 has been confirmed by the Central Statistical Organization (CSO).”   
  The minimum lending rate for banks as prescribed by the RBI was 16.50% in 1995-96 
while it declined to 14.50% to 15.00% in 1996-97 [Report on Currency and Finance, RBI (1997-
98)].  In other words, the bank loan supply cut was not enforced through changes in bank lending 
rates (though spread on actual bank loans over the minimum lending rate might have increased).  
The average interest rate on commercial paper during 1996-97 was 192 basis points lower than 
the minimum lending rate for banks.  Given that the average non-issuer of short-term public debt 
was unlikely to get bank loans at the prime rate (and that both sets of firms issuers and non-
issuers have bank debt) implies that the a-priori sorting of firms into issuers and non-issuers is a 
robust method of identifying differences in information asymmetries and access to capital 
markets.  A macro-measure measure of the changes in collateral values in the economy is the 
change in market capitalization of the major stock exchange. The market capitalization of the 
Bombay stock exchange declined from 526, 4760 million rupees in 1995-96 to 463,9150 million 
rupees in 1996-9797 [Report on Currency and Finance, RBI (1997-98)].       
This combination of a time period of robust economic growth and a simultaneous decline 
in bank credit availability provides a convenient setting, to construct an empirical test of the 
impact of differing levels of information asymmetries and credit market imperfections on 
inventory investments of firms.  
 
 
 
3.  Data Description and Hypotheses Tested  
   9
This section presents the basic sample construction and research method adopted in this 
study. 
3.1.  Database and Sample Construction  
The primary empirical focus of this study is on a cross-sectional analysis of firm-level 
inventory investments during the year 1996-97.  The data for the analysis comes from the 
PROWESS database.  PROWESS is a publicly available database maintained by the Center for 
Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE).  The database is analogous to an abridged version of 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP.  Khanna and Palepu (2000) note that this database has become a 
standard one used by researchers and management professionals to analyze Indian companies.  
The PROWESS database covers firms operating on various stock exchanges in India.   
PROWESS has accounting information drawn from annual reports and other company filings 
required by Indian regulatory authorities.  PROWESS in addition has data on daily stock prices 
and information on corporate news items from press releases.          
The starting point for sample construction for the current study is the set of publicly listed 
firms with the most current financial statements in the period 1996-97.  This time period matches 
the RBI’s budgetary fiscal year.  As a further screen 1446 firms were eliminated from the 1996-
97 sample since they changed their accounting year or did not have their financial statements on 
an annual basis for 1996-97.  Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (2000) note that the coefficient of 
liquidity in financially distressed firms is downward biased and findings from financially 
distressed firms cannot be generalized to a cross-section of firms.  Therefore, 118 firms that had 
total borrowings higher or equal to total assets were eliminated since these are very likely 
financially distressed firms.  While checking for obvious data errors, 222 firms with interest 
expenses higher than total borrowings (which had other data errors also) were eliminated.  The 
requirement that the firms have accounting data for 1996-97 and 1997-98 for the baseline 
regressions resulted in a sample of 1888 firms.  This sample comprises of 621 firms that have 
short-term arm’s length debt outstanding (issuer firms) and 1267 firms that do not have short-  10
term arm’s length debt outstanding (non-issuer firms).   However, some regressions have fewer 
observations due to missing data needed to calculate particular independent variables.   
 
3.2. Model  specifications and hypotheses tested 
  We analyze the relation between various types of corporate investments (focusing for 
most part on inventories) and liquidity by sorting firms on the basis of an a priori measure of 
access to capital markets and information asymmetries i.e. firms that have commercial paper 
and/or short-term fixed deposits (issuers) outstanding and firms that do not have commercial 
paper and/or short-term fixed deposits (non-issuers) outstanding following Kashyap, et. al. 
(1994) and Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel (1995) which yields a clear prediction as to the 
sorting criterion’s effect on firm investments.  Non- issuer firms are predicted to face higher 
liquidity constraints relative to issuer firms.  Kaplan and Zingales’ (1997) criticism of a number 
of prior studies in this strand of the literature based on the theoretical ambiguity of the sorting 
criterion used by those studies does not apply here.    
.       The baseline regression models are estimated as, 
Ln (Iit - Ii,t-1) =  α0 + β1 [Ln (I/S)i,t-1]+ β2 (Ln Sit – Ln Si,t-1) + β3 (Ln Si,t-1 – Ln Si,t-2) 
                        + β4 Lt + β5 (Ii,t-1 - Ii,t-2) + β6 [(BD/TA)i,t-1 + β7 [(TC/TA)i,t-1  
                        + β7 Group) + β8 (Industry 1) +…β 27 (Industry 20) + eit           -(1)                        
The raw change in inventory investments data for issuer firms has a mean (median) of 
6.39 (0.33) and non-issuers mean (median) of 0.711 (0.11) [Table 1] and are highly skewed.   
Therefore, the dependent variable in the inventory models used is the change in the natural log of 
inventory investments.  Kaplan and Zingales (1997) note that while prior studies have used cash 
flow or cash stock as their measures of liquidity, the theory does not distinguish between cash 
flow and cash stock: the effect of an extra dollar of funds should be the same, independent of 
whether it enters the firm this period as cash flow or was present in the firm at the beginning of   11
the period as cash stock.  The key explanatory variable of interest is liquidity, which is defined as 
cash flow generated during the period, plus the beginning of the year starting liquidity stock 
available scaled by beginning of the year total assets.  Kaplan and Zingales (1997) note that any 
splitting criterion that sorts firms into sub-samples with differential outliers in growth rates of 
sales may be biased towards finding a difference in the coefficients on liquidity.  To address this 
concern the baseline regression models are estimated using the minimum sum of absolute errors 
regression [See Narula and Wellington, 1982 for a detailed survey of the statistical and 
computational properties of minimum absolute deviation estimators].  Detailed description of all 
variables used in this study is available in Appendix 1.   Prowess user manual (1997) notes that 
in general firms having marketable securities of their peer group firms will not divest their 
holdings.  Hence such holdings of marketable securities may not be truly liquid in nature.   
Therefore, a robust measure of liquidity that subtracts marketable securities owned in group 
firms by other firms in the same group is used in the baseline regression specification.  
  The first set of control variables following Kashyap, et. al. (1993) include a constant 
term, the log of inventory-sales ratio at the beginning of the period, the change in the log of firm 
sales over the current and preceding period as well as 20 industry dummy variables which are 
constructed to be analogous to 2-digit SIC codes in the U.S. (See Khanna and Palepu, 2000).  
The beginning of the period inventory sales ratio and change in log sales terms are motivated by 
a target adjustment inventory model [Lovell, 1961].  This specification is also consistent with a 
cost-minimization model that assumes quadratic costs of producing output and deviating from a 
target- inventory sales ratio (See Kashyap and Wilcox, 1993).  The lagged change in the log of 
inventories variable controls for the possibility that the behavior of inventories is a gradually 
adjusting process in an emerging market like India.  The industry dummies and the coefficient 
terms are included to subsume any industry wide or economy effects for example effect of 
interest rates.  This set of variables is intended to control for non-financial determinants of 
inventories.    12
In addition a group dummy, bank debt to total assets ratio and trade credit to total assets 
ratio variables are included as further controls.  The group dummy variable is equal to 1 if the 
firm is part of a business group and 0 otherwise.  Khanna and Palepu (2000) note that the 
absence of well-developed intermediary institutions in India makes it costly for Indian firms to 
acquire necessary inputs and the scale and scope of business groups could allow groups to 
internally replicate functions not provided by intermediary institutions in India.  Fafchamps, 
Gunning and Oostendorp (1997) examine inventories in a developing country i.e. Zimbabwe and 
find evidence consistent with concerns about timeliness of input deliveries being a significant 
determinant of inventory levels.  Business groups could reduce concerns about timeliness of 
input deliveries partially i.e. among transaction with peer firms within a group.   
The bank debt to total assets ratio is included for two reasons.  First, bank debt is the 
largest source of debt financing for firms in India, the mean (median) bank debt to total assets 
ratio for issuer firms is 0.166 (0.155) compared to their mean total borrowings to total assets 
ratio of 0.363 (0.368).  Similarly, the mean (median) bank debt to total assets ratio for non-issuer 
is 0.163 (0.140) compared to their mean total borrowings to total assets ratio of 0.356 (0.350).  
Therefore controlling for any potential impact of bank credit on a firm’s ability to invest in 
inventories is needed.  Banks are also important in the corporate capital acquisition process and 
perform information production and monitoring functions [See Diamond (1984) and (1991), 
Fama (1985), Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), Rajan (1992) and Sharpe (1991) among others].  
Second to control for the possibility that there could be differences in collateral characteristics of 
inventories within industry categories for example collateral characteristics might be driven by 
differences in product mix across firms within the 2-digit industry categories.  Finally, trade 
credit to total assets ratio is included for the following reason.  Trade credit is an important 
source of debt financing, second in magnitude only to bank financing for the sample Indian 
firms.  Petersen and Rajan (1997) find that small firms whose access to capital markets may be 
limited use more trade credit.  Further specifications estimated in this study sort firms by   13
differing access to short-term arm’s length debt markets so controlling for a cross-sectional 
differences in access to an important source of substitute financing represented by trade credit is 
important.  This set of variables is intended to control for the financial determinants of 
inventories besides liquidity.     
Stated formally the two research hypotheses investigated using the baseline regression 
models are as follows. 
  Wedge between internal and external financing costs hypothesis which is stated as,  
H0 = β4 = 0 for both sets of firms  
HA = β4 > 0 for both sets of firms 
  Differences in liquidity constraints hypothesis with non-issuer firms facing higher 
liquidity constraints, 
H0 = β4 (non-issuer firms) ≤ β4 (issuer firms)    
HA = β4 (non-issuer firms) > β4 (issuer firms)   
  Similar baseline models with individual components of inventory terms instead of 
aggregate inventories are tested.   In addition within industry regressions for non-issuer firms are 
estimated for industries with more than 30 observations to check if differences in investment-
liquidity sensitivities are broad based results or driven by a few industries.    
  The baseline results follow FHP’s methodology.  Kaplan and Zingales (1997 and 2000) 
criticize the FHP methodology by stressing that firms which have internal funds (i.e. liquidity) 
higher than their firm investments are unconstrained and presumably findings of relative 
differences for any two sets of such firms are potentially spurious.  Stiglitz (Discussion and 
Comments, 1988) in commenting on the original FHP study makes a related point.  He suggests 
that a more powerful method to test for the importance of the cash flow constraint is to check if 
the cash flow constraint is actually binding.  Moyen (2002) presents models and simulation data 
on two firm types, unconstrained firms that can raise funds on external markets and the   14
constrained firms that cannot do so.  She finds results consistent with Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997) that absolute levels of investment cash flow sensitivities are lower for unconstrained 
firms than for constrained firms. Whether unconstrained firms have lower or higher investment 
cash flow sensitivities is ultimately an empirical question best addressed by actual data.   
Moreover, it is possible that within two sets of a priori sorted firms unconstrained firms have 
higher (and not significantly different relative levels) absolute levels of investment cash flow 
sensitivities and constrained firms have lower (but significantly different relative levels) absolute 
levels of investment cash flow sensitivities.    
We divide both issuer and non-issuer firm sub-samples into two sets of firms: firms that 
had total investments higher than their internal funds (i.e. liquidity) which presumably had to 
access the external markets (unconstrained firms in Moyen’s terminology) and firms that had 
total investments equal to or lower than their internal funds (constrained firms in Moyen’s 
terminology and firms for which the liquidity constraint was binding in Stiglitz’s terms).   This 
provides a direct test of whether the absolute levels of liquidity constraints are higher or lower 
for firms that had to access the external markets.  More important, in our view, it provides 
evidence on whether the differences in relative liquidity constraints among issuer and non-issuer 
firms are driven by firms that did not access external markets (in which case it would be difficult 
to interpret them as differences in liquidity constraints) or whether the differences in relative 
liquidity constraints are driven by firms that accessed the external markets (and given that they 
are sorted a priori on differing levels of information asymmetries, it is relatively safe to interpret 
them as differences in liquidity constraints).  
However, even findings consistent with only firms that accessed external markets having 
relative differences in liquidity constraints with issuer firms having lower investment liquidity 
sensitivities than non-issuers is not necessarily conclusive evidence in favor of liquidity 
constraints.  Kaplan and Zingales (1997) note that prior studies of liquidity constraints interpret 
greater investment cash flow sensitivity for firms considered more likely to face a larger wedge   15
between the internal and external cost of funds as evidence that the firms are indeed constrained.  
They note further that no study has verified directly whether higher investment cash flow 
sensitivity is related to financing problems, and if it is, in what way.   Therefore, we attempt to 
provide evidence that links the presence of observed higher wedge between external and internal 
finance (by inferring it from higher interest rates on changes in firm debt) and the findings of 
relative differences in investment liquidity sensitivities between two sets of firms a priori 
expected to have differing levels of information asymmetries.    
  The cost of debt unlike equity is easily observable and is not subject to the debate on 
whether markets are efficient or not.  Therefore, we divide both issuer and non-issuer firm sub-
samples into firms that pay a higher interest rate on firm debt relative to the prior year and firms 
that pay equal or lower interest rate.  Firms paying a higher interest rate on firm debt (under the 
assumption of no change in costs of internal funds from prior year) are firms that face an 
increase in the wedge between external and internal finance.  If relative differences in investment 
liquidity sensitivities between issuer and non-issuer firms represent liquidity constraints, in a 
year where a bank loan supply cut was present, they should be driven by (or present in) firms 
that face an increase in the wedge between external and internal finance.         
However, skeptical readers could justifiably argue that unless first, the sources of relative 
differences in investment liquidity sensitivities are identified and second, plausible alternative 
explanations for differences in investment liquidity sensitivities are examined they cannot be 
reliably interpreted as liquidity constraints.  To identify the sources of relative differences in 
investment liquidity sensitivities for aggregate inventories, the baseline regression models are 
further augmented to test for explanations for investment-cash flow sensitivities (if any) based on 
financial intermediation found in the baseline results.  First, the pure bank dependence model is 
tested.  Appendix 2 details the various other hypotheses tested that parallel pure bank 
dependence hypothesis.   
The pure bank dependence regression models are estimated as,   16
Ln (Iit - Ii,t-1) =  α0 + β1 [Ln (I/S)i,t-1]+ β2 (Ln Sit – Ln Si,t-1) + β3 (Ln Si,t-1 – Ln Si,t-2) 
                        + β4 Lt + β5 (Ii,t-1 - Ii,t-2) + β6 [(BD/TA)i,t-1 + β7 [(TC/TA)i,t-1  
                        + β8 (Group) + β9 (Lt*AMBD) + β10 (Industry 1)  
                        +…β 28 (Industry 20) + eit                                                             -(2)          
Lt*AMBD is an interaction term defined as the product of an above median bank debt dummy 
and liquidity that is included in the regression models for issuers and non-issuers.  The 
interpretation of this interaction term is that a non-issuer firm should be bank dependent if three 
conditions are satisfied: (1) it has a low level of liquidity and (2) it does not have access to arm’s 
length short-term debt market and (3) it has a high level of bank debt to total assets ratio.  A 
positive coefficient is predicted on the liquidity term and also on the interaction term for non-
issuers.  As a benchmark to see if the interaction term is not simply picking up differences in 
access to bank financing the corresponding interaction term for an issuer firm represents a firm 
that: (1) has a low level of liquidity and (2) has a high level of bank debt to total assets ratio.  A 
positive coefficient is predicted on the liquidity term and an insignificant coefficient is predicted 
on the interaction term for issuers.  More pertinent, if bank dependence hypothesis is the reason 
for differences in investment-liquidity sensitivities then after controlling for bank dependence the 
differences in investment-liquidity sensitivities between the two set of firms should be 
eliminated.             
  Stated formally the bank dependency based explanation hypothesis is, 
H0 = β9 = 0 for both sets of firms or β9 (non-issuer firms) ≤ β9 (issuer firms)    
HA = β9 > 0 for non-issuer firms and β4 (non-issuer firms) = β4 (issuer firms)   
A couple of hypotheses are related to the pure bank dependence hypothesis.  The first is 
priority lending hypothesis.  The mean (median) total assets of a sample issuer firm are 439.569 
(87.23) in contrast the mean (median) total assets of a non-issuer firm is 116.559 (20.420).  The 
conventional argument applicable to firms in developed countries is that internal funds are more   17
important for smaller firms because of their limited access to capital markets (Eisner, 1978). 
However, one of the five major objectives of Indian government’s industrial policy is the 
promotion of small industry (Sandesara, 1988, p. 640).  Athey and Laumas (1994) and Athey and 
Reeser (2000) find results consistent with internal funds being less important for investments for 
small firms in their sample vis-à-vis large firms in their sample.   To be eligible for priority 
lending assistance the sum of a firm’s paid up capital and free reserves must not exceed 10 
million rupees.  Therefore, we use a benchmark of net worth equal to or less than 10 million to 
identify small firms.  Banerjee and Duflo (2001) find results based on the lending policy of an 
Indian bank, which are consistent with firms that are part of a priority sector getting preferential 
access to bank credit.     
The regression models to test for the priority lending based explanation has 
Liquidity*TABD an interaction term defined as the product of a firm with net worth below 10 
million dummy and liquidity that is included in the regression models for issuers and non-
issuers.   The interpretation of this interaction term is that a firm that has less than 10 million in 
net worth is eligible for preferential credit availability and therefore has lower reliance on 
internal funds.  This leads to a prediction of a positive coefficient on the liquidity term and a 
negative coefficient on the interaction term.  The set of non-issuer firms have a higher number 
and percentage of smaller firms.  Therefore, if priority lending based explanation is the reason 
for differences in investment-liquidity sensitivities then after controlling for it the differences in 
investment-liquidity sensitivities between the two set of firms should be eliminated.                
     A related explanation for observed liquidity coefficients that is not driven by a bank loan 
supply cut is the decline in a firm’s debt capacity (or collateral value).  Under this explanation, a 
decrease in collateral value of a firm could increase the costs of external finance even if bank’s 
willingness to supply loans for a fixed amount of debt capacity of a firm.  It is difficult to come 
up with reasonable micro-level empirical proxies for a firm’s collateral value.  Luckily for Indian 
firms during this time period Banerjee and Duflo (2001) have documented bank loan decision   18
rules followed by an Indian public sector bank to estimate the maximum amount of bank loans a 
firm in our sample is eligible for.  The bank loan limit hypothesis tests whether the differences in 
liquidity coefficients reflect simply differing debt capacities of the two sets of firms.  In other 
words, if say non-issuer firms appear to be bank dependent they may actually simply have lower 
debt capacities.  Firms which at the beginning of the year had bank loans above their maximum 
bank loan limit (Banerjee and Duflo document that in 20% of the cases an Indian bank grants a 
higher bank loans than the official policy) are assumed to be at their maximum debt capacity 
especially since bank debt is the major source of debt for Indian firms.         
  The regression models to test for the loans above the bank limit hypothesis based 
explanation has Liquidity*LABL an interaction term defined as the product of a firm with bank 
loans above the estimated bank loan limit dummy and liquidity that is included in the regression 
models for issuers and non-issuers.   The interpretation of this interaction term is that a firm that 
has reached its bank loan limit is more reliant on it’s internal funds.  This leads to a prediction of 
a positive coefficient on the liquidity term and a positive coefficient on the interaction term.  
Further, since the limit on bank loans is likely to be binding on non-issuer firms relatively more 
than on issuer firms (which have access to public arm’s length short-term debt markets), the 
coefficient on the interaction term is hypothesized to be higher for non-issuers.  Further, if the 
loans above the bank lending limit based explanation is the reason for differences in investment-
liquidity sensitivities then after controlling for it the differences in investment-liquidity 
sensitivities between the two set of firms should be eliminated.                
   An alternative possibility is that if non-issuer firms that are bank dependent do have 
higher investment-liquidity sensitivities it is driven by a higher number of non-issuer firms 
having single bank relationships in the sample.   In this line of reasoning banks exploit an 
exclusive bank relationship and charge client firms a higher cost of debt financing [following 
Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1991)] i.e. make them more liquidity constrained which may lead to β9 
> 0 for non-issuer firm i.e. a rejection of the null bank dependence hypothesis.  Alternatively   19
following Myers and Majluf (1984) single bank relationships may play a positive role in 
reducing information asymmetries and therefore may lead to β9 (non-issuer firms) < β9 (issuer 
firms) i.e. an incorrect rejection of the alternative bank dependence hypothesis.  Houston and 
James (1995) find that U.S. firms that rely on a single bank have a much greater sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow than do firms that have multiple banking relationships or that borrow in 
public debt markets.  In sum, empirically examining the impact of single bank relationships is 
important.   
  The regression models are estimated including Liquidity*SBD an interaction term 
defined as the product of a firm with a single bank relationship dummy and liquidity that is 
included in the regression models for issuers and non-issuers.  The interpretation of this 
interaction term is that if single banking relationships aggravate liquidity constraints then the 
firms with single banking relationships should face higher investment-liquidity sensitivities.  In 
this case the interaction term is predicted to have a positive coefficient.  If this is the reason 
behind non-issuer firms facing higher liquidity constraints then the coefficient on the interaction 
term should be higher for non-issuer firms.  If single banking relationships mitigate liquidity 
constraints then firms with single banking relationships should face lower investment-liquidity 
sensitivities.  In this case, the interaction term is predicted to have a negative coefficient.  More 
important, if single banking relationship hypothesis is the reason for differences in investment-
liquidity sensitivities then after controlling for it the differences in investment-liquidity 
sensitivities between the two set of firms should be eliminated.              
  Gibson (1995) using Japanese firm data found that firm investment is sensitive to the 
financial health of the firm’s main bank holding constant Q and cash flow.  Hubbard et. al. 
(2002) find that even after controlling for proxies for borrower risk and information costs, the 
cost of borrowing from low capital banks is higher than borrowing from well capitalized banks.  
Second and more pertinent to our study, this cost difference is traceable to borrowers for which 
information costs and incentive problems are a priori important i.e. potentially for non-issuers.   20
This line of reasoning suggests that independent of the bank dependence and individual firm 
characteristics, if non-issuers are more likely to have their main banking relationship with a low 
capital bank then differences in investment liquidity sensitivities might reflect simply weak bank 
health spillovers.    
  The regression models are estimated including Liquidity*WBD an interaction term 
defined as the product of a firm with a main bank relationship with a below 8 percent capital 
adequacy ratio (as per Basle standards) dummy and liquidity that is included in the regression 
models for issuers and non-issuers.  The interpretation of this interaction term is that if a weak 
banking relationship aggravate liquidity constraints then the firms with such banking 
relationships should face higher investment-liquidity sensitivities.  In this case the interaction 
term is predicted to have a positive coefficient.  If this is the reason behind non-issuer firms 
facing higher liquidity constraints then the coefficient on the interaction term should be higher 
for non-issuer firms.   More pertinently, if this hypothesis is driving the differences in liquidity 
constraints between issuers and non-issuers controlling for it will eliminate these differences. 
   Kaplan and Zingales (2000) put forth the flypaper effect (Hines and Thaler, 1995) based 
explanation for why unconstrained firms in their sample have higher investment liquidity 
sensitivities.  Cleary (1999) confirms the findings of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) in a larger 
sample of firms and finds that unconstrained firms in his sample also have higher investment 
liquidity sensitivities.  Cleary presents a free cash flow problem based explanation which states 
that firms increase investment in response to availability of higher levels of free cash flows 
(Jensen, 1986).  Kadapakkam et. al. (1998) find that the investment cash flow sensitivities are 
highest in the large firm size group and lowest in the small firm size group for their sample of 
firms in six OECD countries.  They interpret their findings as being consistent with agency 
problems between managers and shareholders that are more severe for firms with lower levels of 
insider equity ownership.       21
  The regression models to test for the agency problems based explanation are estimated 
with Liquidity*BMICFR is an interaction term defined as the product of a firm with below 
median insider’s cash flow rights (equity ownership) dummy and liquidity that is included in the 
regression models for issuers and non-issuers.  The interpretation of this interaction term is that 
firms that have lower levels of insider cash flow rights (equity ownership) should have a higher 
propensity to over-invest.  This leads to a prediction of a positive coefficient on the liquidity 
term and a positive coefficient on the interaction term. More pertinent, if the agency problems 
based explanation is the reason for differences in investment-liquidity sensitivities then after 
controlling for it the differences in investment-liquidity sensitivities between the two set of firms 
should be eliminated.              
The regression models to test for the second agency problems based explanation i.e. the 
flypaper effect and/or free cash flow problems based explanation are estimated with 
Liquidity*AMIALD an interaction term defined as the product of a firm with above median 
industry adjusted liquidity dummy and liquidity that is included in the regression models for 
issuers and non-issuers.  The interpretation of this interaction term is that a firm that has higher 
liquidity on an industry-adjusted basis is more susceptible to the flypaper effect and/or free cash 
flow problems.  This leads to a prediction of a positive coefficient on the liquidity term and a 
positive coefficient on the interaction term.  More important, if the flypaper effect and/or free 
cash flow based explanation is the reason for differences in investment-liquidity sensitivities then 
after controlling for it the differences in investment-liquidity sensitivities between the two set of 
firms should be eliminated.                
  Most models of investment imply that information and incentive problems lead firms to 
under-invest.  However, Jensen (1986) has argued that if managers prefer growth to profitability 
they may invest free-cash flow in negative net present value projects.  In this view, the 
investment liquidity sensitivities reflect over-investment rather than under-investment.  While 
the agency problems and flypaper effect explanations address this concern, we adopt a further   22
test to mitigate any remaining concerns.  According to the over-investment theory the difference 
in inventory investment liquidity coefficients of issuers and non-issuers should be larger for 
firms with lower opportunity costs of under-investment i.e. lower operating margins.  To explore 
this possibility, we divide the sample into firms with above median operating margins and those 
with below median operating margins.  
  The regression models to test for this third agency problems based explanation i.e. the 
over-investment explanation are estimated with Liquidity*AMOP an interaction term defined as 
the product of a firm with above median operating margins dummy and liquidity that is included 
in the regression models for issuers and non-issuers.  The interpretation of this interaction term is 
that a firm that has higher operating margins is less subject to the over-investment and/or cash 
flow problems.  This leads to a prediction of a positive coefficient on the liquidity term and a 
negative coefficient on the interaction term.  If the over-investment explanation is the reason for 
differences in investment-liquidity sensitivities then after controlling for it the differences in 
investment-liquidity sensitivities between the two set of firms should be eliminated. 
   Almeida and Campello (2001) analysis suggests that firms should be examined using 
criterion beyond their financial characteristics to determine liquidity constraints.  They suggest 
examining differences in the underlying conditions governing investment and contractibility.  La 
Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) present evidence on legal regimes affecting 
the extent of agency problems in firms around the world.  We use the criterion of splitting our 
sample into domestic firms and foreign firms, which have non-Indian legal regime for their 
parent companies.    
  The regression models to test for this fourth agency problems/legal regimes based 
explanation are estimated with Liquidity*FD an interaction term defined as the product of a 
foreign firm dummy and liquidity that is included in the regression models for issuers and non-
issuers.  The interpretation of this interaction term is that a foreign firm i.e. a firm publicly listed 
on Indian stock exchange but which is controlled by and has it’s parent firm outside India might   23
have stronger rule of law and better governance and contractibility standards and therefore lower 
liquidity constraints.  Khanna and Palepu (1999) find that Indian firms with higher foreign 
ownership have higher market values.  This leads to a prediction of a positive coefficient on the 
liquidity term and a negative coefficient on the interaction term.  If the legal regimes based 
explanation is the reason for differences in investment-liquidity sensitivities then after 
controlling for it the differences in investment-liquidity sensitivities between the two set of firms 
should be eliminated. 
  Krueger (2002) presents evidence on South Korean firms where large group firms receive 
higher bank credit and expand more because their firm size is a political asset.  Khanna and 
Palepu (2000) designate Indian business groups with more than 17 firms as large groups.  We 
use Khanna and Palepu’s criterion to divide the sample into large group firms and others firms.  
If large group firms have easier and higher access to credit due to crony capitalism than their 
investment liquidity sensitivities should be reduced.   
The regression models to test for this fourth agency problems based legal regimes based 
explanation are estimated with Liquidity*LGD an interaction term defined as the product of a 
large group firm dummy and liquidity that is included in the regression models for issuers and 
non-issuers.  The interpretation of this interaction term is that a large group firm is potentially 
subject to problems of crony capitalism and can have access to higher credit from banks.  This 
leads to a prediction of a positive coefficient on the liquidity term and a negative coefficient on 
the interaction term.  If the crony capitalism based explanation is the reason for differences in 
investment-liquidity sensitivities then after controlling for it the differences in investment-
liquidity sensitivities between the two set of firms should be eliminated. 
Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2002) examine firm’s propensity to save cash out of 
cash inflows, which they refer to as the cash flow sensitivity of cash.  They find that for their 
sample U.S. firms, the cash flow sensitivity of cash is not significantly different from zero for 
unconstrained firms, but positively and significantly different from zero for constrained firms.    24
Their findings could imply that liquidity in any given year represents different proportions of 
precautionary liquidity between issuer firms (unconstrained firms) and non-issuer firms 
(constrained firms) for our analysis.  In order to test for the differences in propensity to save 
cash, we test for a version of the debt overhang problem that incorporates this concern.  The debt 
overhang regressions are estimated with Liquidity*DO an interaction term defined as the product 
of a firm that has above median debt overhang and liquidity.  The interpretation of this 
interaction term is that if a firm faces a relatively large portion of its debt coming due for 
redemption in the current and next three years (since these redemptions are fully anticipated by 
the firm) it will lead to higher precautionary savings of cash out of liquidity, therefore the 
liquidity constraint should be decreased.  This leads to a prediction of a positive coefficient on 
the liquidity term and a negative coefficient on the interaction term.  If the debt overhang based 
explanation is the reason for differences in investment-liquidity sensitivities then after 
controlling for it the differences in investment-liquidity sensitivities between the two set of firms 
should be eliminated. 
  Baseline and pure bank dependency regression models are estimated for 1995-96 and 
1997-98 to shed light on the issue of a causal link between RBI’s policy to engineer a bank loan 
supply cut and the investment liquidity sensitivities faced by Indian manufacturing firms during 
1996-97. 
Further regression models explore the relation between capital investments and liquidity.  
The regression models are estimated with dependent variable as the capital investments 
undertaken by the firm.  The specification broadly follows Hoshi et. al. (1991) and includes 
beginning of the period Q to control for growth opportunities, log change in sales and lagged 
change in sales to control for the accelerator effects.  An interaction term defined as the product 
of above median q dummy and liquidity is included.  Bank debt and trade credit terms are 
included following similar reasoning as for inventory investments.  The interpretation of this 
interaction term is if a firm has above median growth opportunities it should have a lower   25
propensity to over-invest.  This leads to a prediction of a positive coefficient on the liquidity 
term and a negative coefficient on the interaction term.  Further, to examine what explains 
relative differences in capital investment liquidity sensitivities between issuer and non-issuer 
firms, the pure bank dependency hypothesis is examined.  Similar regression models with the 
dependent variable firm total investments are estimated.   
 
4.  Addressing the differences in mismeasurement of Q between unconstrained and 
constrained firms  
  
Poterba (1988) in his discussion of FHP (1988), points out that measurement problem in 
Q can cloud the interpretation of their empirical results.  Alti (2002) notes that if Q performs 
worse for constrained firms relative to unconstrained firms, higher sensitivities of liquidity to 
investment might arise for these firms simply because liquidity reflects information about 
investment opportunities.  Other studies including Hubbard (1998), Erikson and Whited (2000) 
and Stein (2001) have noted that this is a problem for studies in the literature on corporate 
investments which use the neo-classical Q framework.   
  The problem of mismeasurement of Q can be re-cast as:   
a.  the problem that liquidity (or cash flow for a number of prior studies) reflects the 
expectations of future profitability that have not been captured by empirical proxies of 
marginal Q  
b.  and the fact that due to the high correlation between current profitability and liquidity 
current profitability cannot be used to control for expectations of future profitability not 
captured by Q in a regression setting.   
Alti (2002) presents simulation results consistent with younger firms facing higher 
mismeasurement of   26
 Q problems due to potentially higher growth rates and more valuable long-term growth options.  
In essence, if a method can control for the multi-dimensional differences between unconstrained 
and constrained firms while allowing for a regression framework that does not suffer from 
multicollinearity problems the relationship between investments and liquidity can be examined 
in a robust manner.   
  In labor economics, Lalonde (1986) finds that non-experimental methods for assessing 
the treatment effects may yield biased estimates because a ‘truly’ matched sample of control 
observations is required to infer causality.  However, there are several characteristics in which 
the treatment and control groups differ, the task of constructing a matched sample becomes 
virtually impossible by conventional means – which is often referred to the curse of 
dimensionality (Villalonga, 2000).  The problem of the curse of dimensionality is similar to the 
problem that is faced by studies that want to interpret liquidity coefficients affecting corporate 
investments while controlling for the mismeasurement of Q problem (since differences in 
mismeasurement of Q between samples of unconstrained and constrained firms could differ 
across various dimensions).    
  Dehejia and Wahba (1998 and 1999) develop an algorithm that deals with the problem of 
the curse of 
dimensionality.  I adept their method for examining the issue of corporate investments and 
liquidity constraints.  Specifically, propensity scores - the predicted values from a probit model 
of a firm’s decision to issue short-term public debt (or any other sorting criterion used by a study 
to a-priori sort firms into constrained and unconstrained firms) that relates to future expectations 
of profitability- are used to match groups of issuers and non-issuers firms and then baseline 
regression specifications for inventory, capital and total firm investments are run within these 
sub-samples of matched propensity scores to estimate liquidity coefficients.       27
The propensity score is defined as the probability of assignment to treatment (i.e. sorting 
criterion for studies following FHP methodology) conditional on a vector of independent 
variables Xi : 
P(Xi) = Pr (Di = 1 | Xi) = E (Di | Xi)                                                  -(3) 
  The propensity score theorem states that if the treatment assignment is ignorable 
conditional on X, then it is also ignorable conditional on the propensity score: 
Yi1, Yi0 ┴ Di | Xi => Yi1, Yi0 ┴ Di | p (Xi)                                        -(4) 
    The theorem implies that observations with the same propensity score have the 
same distribution of vectors of variables Xi.  By matching on Q and potential alternative 
variables that might capture expectations of future profitability i.e. current net profit and age 
of the firm maximum comparability between treatment and control groups is attained.   
Briefly, the steps taken in estimating the propensity regressions are:      
1.  Estimating the propensity to issue short-term publicly listed debt that relates to 
expectations of future profitability:  where the Xis used are empirical proxy for firm Q, 
net profits and age of the firm.  Readers should note that future studies could expand the 
set of Xis as needed for their analysis.   
2.  Computing propensity scores for treated (issuers) and control (non-issuers) observations 
as the predicted values from the probit model in step 1.   
3.  Discarding all control (non-issuers) firms that cannot be compared to a treatment (issuer) 
firm and vice versa. 
4.  Classifying all firms into blocks defined by the classes of propensity score distribution 
that have matching treated (issuer) and control (non-issuer) firms. 
5.  Estimating the baseline regressions for treated (issuers) and control (non-issuer) firms 
within each block with minimum 15 observations for each sub-sample of firms.  
                
5. Empirical  Results   28
    
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the sample firms for the year 1996-97. Support for a 
macro-level liquidity constraint on inventory investment is provided by a median increase of 
0.077 in sales for issuers and 0.087 for non-issuers (means are driven by outliers).  The 
corresponding median inventory to total assets ratio remains roughly constant.  Issuer firms 
whether measured by beginning of the period total assets or sales are bigger than non-issuer 
firms.  At the summary statistics level interpreting which set of firms is more liquidity 
constrained is ambiguous.  Issuer firms have higher mean (median) liquidity of 0.201 (0.198) 
than the corresponding number for non-issuer firms of 0.155 (0.150) but this difference is not 
significantly different.  A more complete interpretation of liquidity is only possible in a 
multivariate regression setting.  Bank debt, perhaps not too surprisingly in an emerging market, 
is the biggest source of debt financing for both set of firms.  The mean (median) bank debt is 
0.166 (0.155) for issuer firms and the mean (median) bank debt for non-issuer firms is 0.163 
(0.131).  The difference in bank debt among issuer and non-issuer firms is not significant which 
implies it is an equally important source of financing for both sets of firms on average.  Trade 
credit is the second largest source of debt financing.  The high reliance of Indian manufacturing 
firms on trade credit is consistent with Khanna and Palepu (2000) explanation that India does not 
have well-developed intermediary institutions and Petersen and Rajan (1997) findings that firms 
use more trade credit when credit from financial institutions is not available.  Alternative sources 
of short-term debt financing besides bank debt are a lot smaller.  However, 32.8% of the sample 
firms are issuer firms i.e. they have access to the short-term arm’s length debt market represented 
by having commercial paper and/or short-term fixed deposits outstanding.   
  Consistent with Indian manufacturing firms being financially constrained during 1996-97 
with non-issuers more so than issuers are the mean (median) finance gap to total assets ratio of –
0.004 (-0.001) for issuers and –0.0132 (-0.006) for non-issuers.  This indicates that the mean and 
median firm for issuers invested close to their internal funds while the mean and median non-  29
issuer firms invested less than their internal funds.  The finance gap is significantly different with 
issuer firms having a lower finance gap.   The mean (median) issuer firm faced an increase in 
external internal cost of financing wedge of 0.015 (0.006) i.e. the interest rate on total debt for 
1996-97 was 150 basis points higher relative to 1995-96 while the mean (median) non-issuer 
firm faced an increase in the external internal cost of financing wedge of 0.017 (0.010).  The 
increase in external internal cost of financing wedge was not significantly different possibly 
becuase the increase in the wedge is conditional on whether a firm accesses the external debt 
market and for how much debt.      
  Table 2 presents results of a baseline OLS regression, median regression and OLS 
regression using a conservative measure for liquidity for issuer and non-issuer firms.  In Table 1 
summary statistics show raw changes in inventory investments are skewed and have outliers.  
Therefore the dependent variable used is the change in the log of inventories over the year 1996-
97.  The findings of a negative coefficient on the start of the period’s inventory to sales ratio for 
non-issuers and a positive coefficient on the change in the log sales terms for all specifications 
are consistent with Kashyap and Wilcox’s (1993) cost minimization model which assumes that 
firms face quadratic costs of producing output and of deviating from a target inventory-sales 
ratio.  The findings of a positive coefficient (for both sets of firms) on the change in log of firm 
sales term are consistent with accelerator effects where inventory adjusts with a lag to prior sales 
growth.  The key explanatory variables of interest are liquidity.  Not too surprisingly, the 
absolute wedge between internal and external financing costs hypothesis fails to be rejected since 
liquidity is positive and significantly different for both set of firms for all baseline regression 
specifications.  The differences in relative liquidity constraints is confirmed since the liquidity 
coefficient for non-issuer firms (which are a priori expected to face higher levels of information 
asymmetry and lower access to capital markets) is higher than the coefficient for issuer firms for 
all three baseline OLS regression models.   The summary statistics show differences in changes 
in sales ratio i.e. sales growth in both sets of firms.  To address Kaplan and Zingales (1997)   30
concern that the differences in sales growth may bias towards finding a differences in investment 
liquidity sensitivities across two sets of firms a median regression specification is used.  The 
differences in investment liquidity sensitivities are robust to using a median regression 
specification, which uses minimum absolute deviation estimators (Narula and Wellington, 1982).  
The differences in investment liquidity sensitivities remain significantly different at the 0.1 
percent level.
 3   An explanation of our findings till now could be that accounting measures of 
liquidity for group firms could be more polluted and this could induce a bias.  In the third 
specification one source of pollution in liquidity measures is controlled for.  Group firms invest 
in marketable securities of other firms in their group along with marketable securities of other 
firms.  It is not clear how liquid these marketable securities really are.  Therefore, a robust 
measure of liquidity that subtracts out marketable securities of peer group firms owned by firms 
in the same group is used.  The magnitude of liquidity coefficients are approximately similar to 
the baseline OLS regression and the differences in investment liquidity sensitivities are between 
issuer and non-issuer firms is still significantly different at the 5% level of confidence.  
  The beginning of the period trade credit to total assets ratio is negative for all 
specifications in Table 2.  These findings are consistent with Petersen and Rajan’s (1997) 
findings that suppliers tend to lend to constrained firms since they have a comparative advantage 
in getting information about buyers, which should lead to lowered liquidity constraints. 
  An issue regarding these results is that the findings of non-issuer firms facing higher 
liquidity  
constraints i.e. investment liquidity sensitivities might be driven by only a few industries.  To 
address this concern baseline regression for sub-samples, which have more than 30 observations 
within a 2-digit industry classification, are estimated.  Table 7 presents these results.  10 out of 
14 industries have positive coefficients for liquidity. Assuming that the findings of positive and 
                                                 
3 In an unreported specification observations with DFBETA’s for liquidity coefficients greater than 2/square root of 
observations were eliminated and OLS regressions estimated.  The magnitudes of liquidity coefficients decline   31
negative estimates are equally likely, the probability of obtaining 10 or more positive coefficients 
out of 14 is 9%.  Further, these findings demonstrate that the presence of liquidity constraints is a 
widespread phenomenon not restricted to a few industries.   
  The differences in liquidity coefficients between issuers and non-issuers are statistically 
significant as is the liquidity coefficient of 0.545 for non-issuer firms.  However, whether the 
magnitude of the difference is economically meaningful has to be addressed.  The following 
calculations are only approximations since a structural interpretation of the baseline regressions 
is not recommended.  The mean non-issuer firm cut their inventories/total assets ratio by 5.01% 
in real terms with inflation assumed at 5% on average during this time period in India (Banerjee 
and Duflo, 2001).  The mean value of the liquidity/total assets variable for non-issuers is 15.5% 
with a standard deviation of 14.8%.  This means for a non-issuer firm, a one standard deviation 
change in liquidity results in an increase of inventories of 14.8% multiplied by 0.545 = 8.07% 
approx.    
Consistent with investment liquidity sensitivities not being spurious and representing 
liquidity constraints are the results from the financing gap and no financing gap regressions 
[Table 2].  There is no difference in the investment liquidity sensitivities between issuer and non-
issuer firms among firms that had no financing gap i.e. firms which had total investments equal 
to or below their level of internal funds.  There is a significant difference in the investment 
liquidity sensitivities with non-issuer firms having higher sensitivities for firms that faced a 
financing gap i.e. firms that had to access the external markets since their total investments were 
above their level of internal funds.   Unlike Moyen’s (2002) findings based on simulated data, 
the absolute level of investment liquidity sensitivities is higher for firms that had no financing 
gap (i.e. unconstrained firms).  A caveat to drawing parallels with Moyen (2002) is that in the 
actual data we only observe the realized no financing gap, whether a firm could have financed 
higher investments by accessing external markets but choose not to do so and therefore should be 
                                                                                                                                                             
modestly and differences in liquidity coefficients remain significantly different at the 1% level of confidence.         32
included in the (able to finance) financing gap category of firms is unclear.  However this 
misclassification implies noisier estimates and therefore biases against our finding differences in 
liquidity sensitivities in the financing gap sub-sample.  Further, presumably firms that choose not 
to finance higher investments by accessing external markets face higher costs relative to firms 
that do access the external markets, which is precisely what the presence of liquidity constraints 
would imply.     
To draw a direct connection between a higher external internal cost of financing wedge 
and liquidity constraints, the regressions on sub-samples with increase and no increase in 
external internal wedge sub-samples are examined [Table 2].   Consistent with investment 
liquidity sensitivities representing liquidity constraints, the sub-sample of issuer and non-issuer 
firms that face no increase in external internal cost of financing wedge have no significant 
differences in liquidity constraints.  The sub-sample of issuers and non-issuers that face an 
increase in the external internal cost of financing wedge show non-issuers having significantly 
higher investment liquidity sensitivities.  The financing gap and external internal financing 
wedge results buttress the interpretation that investment liquidity sensitivities are liquidity 
constraints.   
The results from first three regression specifications in Table 3 confirm the presence of 
and differences in liquidity coefficients among non-issuer and issuer firms and test whether these 
differences are due to liquidity constraints arising out of dependence on bank financing.  The 
regression specifications, which include an interaction term of the beginning of the period above 
median bank debt to total assets ratio, and liquidity is examined in model 1.  The pure bank 
dependence explanation hypothesis fails to be rejected.  The interaction term is positive for non-
issuer firms which confirm that firms that face higher levels of information asymmetries face 
higher liquidity constraints due to bank dependence.  Further, once the effect of bank dependence 
is controlled for, the differences in liquidity coefficients between issuers and non-issuers are no 
longer significantly different.  This is consistent with bank dependent borrowers among non-  33
issuer firms driving the differences in investment liquidity sensitivities found in the baseline 
regressions.    
According to Indian industrial policy, firms with less than 10 million rupees in net worth 
are eligible for priority bank financing.  These firms therefore, should not face a decrease in bank 
financing and ergo should face lower or no liquidity constraints.  Consistent with this hypothesis 
and with bank dependency in general after controlling for priority lending the differences in 
liquidity constraints between issuers and non-issuers are eliminated.  However, neither liquidity 
nor the interaction term of liquidity with a dummy variable for firms eligible for priority lending 
is significant.  The bank lending channel view confirmed in the prior two regression models 
could also be due to simply firms facing a collateral shock and therefore receiving a lower 
amount of bank financing (for the same level of collateral).  Model 3 presents results based on 
the bank loan limit rule, which is a convenient measure of the bank(s) estimate of individual firm 
debt capacities for purposes of granting bank loans.  Firms with above bank loan limits are likely 
to be at their maximum debt capacity and therefore likely to be driving the differences in 
liquidity constraints.  However, since this debt capacity determination is based on only bank 
lender rules it is another form of bank dependence.  Results confirm that after controlling for 
above bank loan limit firm dummy interacted with liquidity the differences in liquidity 
coefficients between issuers and non-issuers are no longer significant.  The underlying liquidity 
coefficients remain significant for both issuers and non-issuers representing absolute levels of 
liquidity constraints faced by both set of firms.    
Model 4 examines the possibility that the bank dependence hypothesis results from model 
1 are a result of single bank relationships among non-issuer firms.  11.4% of non-issuer firms 
have a single banking relationship as compared to 7.5% of issuer firms with the difference 
significant at the 1% level of confidence.  The findings fail to support the single banking 
relationship based explanation.  The interaction term of single banking relationship dummy and 
liquidity is insignificant for non-issuer firms and the differences in investment liquidity   34
sensitivities between issuer and non-issuer firms are robust to including the single banking 
relationship terms.  The results from single bank relationship regressions are subject to the caveat 
that the identification of banking relationships is done on the basis of Sept 23, 2002 version of 
Prowess which contains the most recent available information for firms in this regard.  To the 
extent that non-issuer firms are smaller firms and hence are more likely to be coded as having 
multiple banking relationships when in fact they had single bank relationships in the fiscal year 
1996-97 i.e. the number of single banking relationships for non-issuer firms might be under-
estimated more than for issuer firms, the coefficient on the single banking relationship 
interaction term is biased more downwards towards zero for non-issuer firms than for issuer 
firms.      
If under-capitalized and weak banks charge a higher rate of interest or cut back credit 
more relative to healthy banks, their borrowers could face higher liquidity constraints regardless 
of whether the firms are issuers or non-issuers.  Model 5 presents results on the weak banks 
hypothesis.    The interaction term of weak banks dummy and liquidity is insignificant for issuer 
firms and significant but surprisingly negative for non-issuer firms.  However, the weak bank 
dummy itself has a positive coefficient for non-issuer firms, combined with the interaction term, 
it is consistent with firms dependent on weak banks carrying higher liquidity stocks (Hubbard et. 
al., 2002) and therefore facing lower liquidity constraints.  More pertinent, the differences in 
investment liquidity sensitivities between issuer and non-issuer firms are robust to including the 
weak bank terms and therefore bank health does not explain the differences. 
A related question that arises from documenting that bank dependence is driving the 
differences in liquidity coefficients between issuers and non-issuer firms is whether the 
allocation of bank debt is efficient?  In order to shed light on this issue, we follow Galindo, 
Schiantarelli and Weiss (2002) in assuming that the marginal product of capital is proportional to 
empirical measures of the average product of capital.  The two proxies for a measure of the 
average product of capital used are the ratio of value added to capital and the ratio of operating   35
profits to capital.  The value added proxy is consistent with a production function of Cobb-
Douglas type and the operating profit proxy is consistent with a production function which is 
homogenous of degree one.
4    Table 3b presents correlation coefficients between the ratio of the 
actual total return to capital to the hypothetical ‘optimal’ return to capital and the bank debt 
quartiles (or change in bank debt allocation over the year 1996-97 quartiles).  Both the 
correlations are negative, regardless of which proxy for the average product of capital is used.  
These findings are consistent with bank debt not being allocated to the most capital efficient 
firms in a year when a bank loan supply cut was instituted.          
Till this stage, all specifications are aimed at both establishing liquidity constraints 
primarily due to information asymmetries and tracing the source of these liquidity constraints by 
examining various characteristics of the financial intermediation process.  Table 4 reports results 
of testing six alternative explanations of the findings of differences in investment liquidity 
sensitivities.   
In model 1 of table 4, the agency problems based explanation hypothesis is not supported 
by the data.  The below median insider’s cash flow rights interaction term is insignificant and 
negative for non-issuer firms.  This demonstrates that firms facing higher levels of agency 
problems do not face higher liquidity constraints among non-issuer firms.  However, for issuer 
firms the interaction term is positive and the liquidity term becomes insignificant.  This is 
consistent with investment liquidity sensitivities being significant for firms with relatively low 
insider ownership.  However, the differences in investment liquidity sensitivities between issuers 
and non-issuers remain significantly different at the 0.1 percent level. 
                                                 
4 To arrive at the measure of efficiency of investment allocation between issuer and non-issuer firms, we proceeded 
as follows.  First we calculated the return to investment for each firm by multiplying investment by the firm by one 
of our proxies of the firm’s marginal product of investment.  We added the return to investment by each firm across 
all firms to get an estimate of the total return to investment for issuer or non-issuer firms.  Next, this measure of total 
return on investment is divided by the total return that would have been realized if investment funds had been 
allocated among firms in proportion to their share of capital in the sample.  Our measure of the efficiency of the 
allocation of investment is the ratio of our estimate of the actual total return on investment to this hypothetical 
estimate of the total return that would have been achieved if investment funds were allocated according to each 
firm’s share of the capital stock.      36
The flypaper effect hypothesis is not supported by the data either.  The above median 
industry adjusted liquidity dummy multiplied with liquidity interaction term has a negative 
coefficient for both issuers and non-issuers.  This implies that firms that have higher industry-
adjusted liquidity levels have lower investment liquidity sensitivities, which is consistent with 
these sensitivities representing liquidity constraints that are relaxed for firms with higher levels 
of internal funds.  It is not consistent with firms with higher levels of internal funds being more 
susceptible to free cash flow problems (Jensen, 1986) or the flypaper effect (Hines and Thaler, 
1995).   
Another possibility is that investment liquidity sensitivities represent over-investment 
rather than under-investment implied by liquidity constraints.  Firms with higher operating 
margins face an higher opportunity cost of under-investing in inventory investments.  In 
regression model 3, we examine the over-investment hypothesis.  The interaction term of 
liquidity with above median operating margin is insignificant for issuer firms and is significant 
and negative for non-issuer firms.  This implies that non-issuer firms with above median 
operating margins face lower investment liquidity sensitivities which is consistent with liquidity 
constraints being reduced for these firms.  This result is not consistent with over-investment 
hypothesis.  The differences in liquidity coefficients remain significantly different and higher for 
non-issuers relative to issuers over-investment does not explain differences in investment 
liquidity sensitivities.    
Regression 4 examines the differences in contracting and governance environment 
between firms by dividing the sub-samples of issuers and non-issuers into foreign firms (i.e. 
firms publicly listed on Indian stock exchange but which are controlled by and have parent firms 
outside India) and domestic Indian firms.  The interaction term of foreign firms and liquidity is 
insignificant for both issuers and non-issuer firms.  The differences in liquidity coefficients 
remain between issuer and non-issuer firms.     37
Regression 5 examines the crony capitalism hypothesis.  The overwhelming majority of 
the Indian banking sector is comprised of Indian government owned banks.  If firms belonging to 
large group firms in India have access to higher bank credit due to political connections or 
lobbying efforts this could explain the differences in liquidity constraints.  The hypothesis finds 
mixed support.  The differences in liquidity coefficients between issuers and non-issuers remain 
so crony capitalism is not driving the differences in liquidity constraints.  However, the 
interaction term of liquidity and large group firm dummy is significant and negative which 
implies that non-issuers that are members of large groups face lower liquidity constraints due to 
higher access to bank credit.   
Regression 6 examines the debt overhang hypothesis.   The above median debt overhang 
dummy multiplied with liquidity interaction term has a negative coefficient for both issuers and 
non-issuers.  The interaction coefficient is significant for issuers.  This implies that issuer firms 
with an anticipated need for redeeming relatively high proportion of debt which has or will 
become due in the next three years have higher precautionary savings in their liquidity relative to 
non-issuer firms.  The findings are consistent with Almeida et. al. (2002) and represent 
differences in liquidity demand explaining differences in liquidity constraints between issuers 
and non-issuers.   
In order to buttress the arguments that the differences in liquidity coefficients represent 
differences in liquidity constraints, Table 4b examines sub-samples that can potentially provide 
relatively unambiguous evidence on this issue.  Previous regression frameworks a-priori sort 
firms into issuers and non-issuers.  It is possible that among non-issuers are some firms that can 
issue short-term public debt if they wanted to and might do so in a year when they face a bank 
loan supply cut.  Regression 1 framework presents results from a sub-sample of non-issuers 
firms which became issuers over the year 1996-97.  Consistent with the sorting of firms into 
issuers and non-issuers representing a-priori differences in potential information asymmetry and 
access to capital markets, the liquidity coefficient on new 1996-97 issuers of short-term public   38
debt is negative and significant.  In contrast the rest of the non-issuers have a liquidity coefficient 
positive and significant.  The difference in liquidity coefficients between the two set of firms is 
significantly different at the 5 percent level of confidence.   
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) read the management’s discussion of operations for their 
sample of U.S. firms and find that a number of firms like Hewlett Packard could have invested 
more if they wanted to and therefore they are unlikely to be liquidity constrained regardless of 
their liquidity coefficients.  In order to implement the equivalent of such a ‘reality’ check in a 
large cross-section of Indian firms we use the fact whether during 1996-97 a non-issuer firm 
extended new loans in the inter-corporate debt markets.  If an non-issuer firm extended such 
loans they are likely to be not liquidity constrained even though they are in the a-priori set of 
firms likely to be liquidity constrained.  Regression 2 in table 4b examines non-issuer firms that 
are potentially ‘misclassified’ as liquidity constrained since they extend new loans in the inter-
corporate debt markets.  Consistent with Kaplan and Zingales (1997) concerns this set of 
‘misclassified’ firms have high positive liquidity coefficients.  However, the underlying liquidity 
coefficient of the rest of non-issuer firms remains positive and significant.  Further, while 
economically the liquidity coefficients are different between ‘misclassified’ non-issuer firms and 
rest of non-issuer firms, the liquidity coefficients are not significantly different.  These results 
present a caveat to the over-interpretation of the a-priori sort of firms into issuers and non-issuers 
of short term public debt representing perfectly unconstrained and constrained firms respectively.   
Stein (2001) in his comprehensive survey of corporate investment notes that corporate 
investment is influenced by both information and agency problems.  In FHP (1988) a-priori 
sorting of firms regression framework the interpretation of liquidity coefficients as liquidity 
constraints implicitly implies that for the differences in liquidity coefficients between the two set 
of firms it is information asymmetry differences that are important and not agency problems.  In 
order to provide direct evidence on this issue a holdout sample of Indian government owned 
firms is examined.  Government firms have access to budgetary support from the government   39
and therefore do not face information asymmetry problems but suffer from agency problems.    
Regression 3 in table 4b examines the liquidity coefficients of Indian government owned firms 
which are not significant and are significantly different from the sample privately owned issuers 
and non-issuer firms at the 5 percent level of confidence.  The results are consistent with 
information asymmetry driving the differences in liquidity constraints.   
Table 6 reports the coefficients of liquidity variables of baseline regressions for inventory 
investments from propensity score regressions that are not subject to the problem of liquidity 
variables capturing differences in expectations of future profitability effects.  The propensity 
scores match issuer and non-issuer firms on three dimensions: Q, net profit and age of the firm.  
5 blocks have adequate number of matching observations for issuers and non-issuers for 
inventories regressions.  In 4 out of 5 blocks the liquidity coefficient of non-issuer firms is higher 
than that of issuer firms.  The results confirm that non-issuer firms face higher liquidity 
constraints and that the differences in liquidity coefficients are not subject to the caveat that firm 
characteristics or future expectations of firm profitability might be different between issuers and 
non-issuers.   However, a majority of observations for inventory investments do not find matches 
for non-issuer and issuer firms.  This is consistent with differences in firm characteristics (as 
captured by the 3 dimensions of firm Q, firm net profits and firm age) between issuers and non-
issuers.   
Till this stage the results of investment liquidity sensitivities are based on inventory 
investments.  It is conceivable that non-issuer firms, which have a higher percentage of high 
growth firms in terms of increased sales, need to invest more in capital investments.  Further, 
non-issuer firms may have their ratio of opportunity costs of forsaking capital investments over 
opportunity costs of forsaking inventory investments to be higher than their ratio of adjustment 
costs of capital investments over adjustment costs of inventory investments.  This implies that 
non-issuer firms choose to face higher liquidity constraints for their inventory investments rather 
than facing higher liquidity constraints for their capital investments.  Issuer firms on the other   40
hand engage in a vice-versa decision.  This line of reasoning predicts that capital investment 
liquidity sensitivities should be lower for non-issuer firms versus issuer firms.  Table 5 reports 
the results of examining capital investments.  Non-issuer firms face higher liquidity constraints 
relative to issuer firms for capital investments, which rejects the above rationale.    The 
regression model 1 parallel the over-investment model except that above median Q proxies for 
higher growth opportunities and therefore higher opportunity costs for such firms if they face 
liquidity constraints.  The interaction term is negative and insignificant which does not support 
the over-investment hypothesis.   The differences in liquidity constraints remain between non-
issuers and issuers for this class of firm investments though only at the 10% level of confidence.  
Model 2 examines the pure bank dependency hypothesis for capital investments; recall that this 
hypothesis found the most support in explaining the differences in inventory investment liquidity 
sensitivities between issuers and non-issuers.  Paralleling the results from inventory investments, 
capital investment liquidity sensitivities are also driven by firms with above median bank debt.  
This is true for both issuers and non-issuers which implies in contrast to inventory investments 
where only non-issuers faced higher liquidity constraints due to higher bank dependence for 
capital investments both sets of firms do.  More important, similar to inventory investment 
results the differences in capital investments liquidity sensitivities between issuers and non-
issuers are no longer significant after controlling for the pure bank dependency terms.      
Another issue is that maybe issuer firms are adjusting their investments at other margins 
i.e. research & development, advertising or investments in labor and therefore there are no 
differences in overall financial constraints that issuer and non-issuer firms face.  Unfortunately 
data on number of employees is not available in Prowess.  However data on investments in 
research & development and advertising are available.  Table 5 presents results based on total 
firm investments that address these concerns.  Non-issuer firms are liquidity constrained in terms 
of their total investments, which includes inventories, capital, research & development and 
advertising investments while issuer firms are not in the over-investment hypothesis.  The   41
difference in liquidity constraints is significantly different at the 2.7 percent level of confidence.  
However these findings are subject to the caveat that total investments include four different 
types of investments that have potentially different adjustment costs.   
Once again, the pure bank dependency hypothesis is examined for total investments.  It 
finds mixed support in the data.  The interaction term of liquidity and above median bank debt 
and the underlying liquidity term are insignificant for both issuers and non-issuers.  However, the 
addition of pure bank dependency terms leads to the differences in total investments liquidity 
sensitivities between issuers and non-issuers being no longer significant.   The overall evidence 
from various hypotheses tested for inventories, capital investments and total investments support 
the investment liquidity sensitivities arising from bank dependency and representing liquidity 
constraints. 
Table 6 reports the coefficients of liquidity variables of baseline regressions for capital 
investments and total firm investments from propensity score regressions that are not subject to 
the problem of liquidity variables capturing differences in mismeasurement of Q effects.  The 
propensity scores match issuer and non-issuer firms which have the data required to estimate the 
capital investment regressions on 3 dimensions: Q, net profit and age of the firm.  A majority of 
observations for capital investments do not find matches for non-issuer among issuer firms.  This 
is consistent with differences in firm characteristics (as captured by the 3 dimensions of firm Q, 
firm net profits and firm age) between issuers and non-issuers.  3 blocks have adequate number 
of matching observations for issuers and non-issuers for capital investment regressions.  In 2 out 
of 3 blocks the liquidity coefficient of issuer firms is higher than that of non-issuer firms.  The 
results reverse the results for capital investment regressions since now non-issuer firms face 
higher liquidity constraints and are consistent with differences in mismeasurement of Q driving 
the prior findings on differences in capital investment liquidity constraints.  The non-matching of 
the majority of the issuers and non-issuer firms in the sub-sample of capital investments provides 
an additional caveat to interpreting the differences in liquidity coefficients between issuer and   42
non-issuer firms as liquidity constraints.   This caveat may or may not be a more general version 
of the concerns raised by Kaplan and Zingales (1998) regarding interpreting a greater sensitivity 
of investment to liquidity as a reliable measure of differences in the liquidity constraints.   
Similar to the findings on capital investments from propensity regressions are the 
findings on total firm investments.  A majority of observations for total firm investments do not 
find matches for non-issuer and issuer firms.  This is consistent with differences in firm 
characteristics (as captured by the 3 dimensions of firm Q, firm net profits and firm age) between 
issuers and non-issuers.  3 blocks have adequate number of matching observations for issuers 
and non-issuers for capital investment regressions.  In 2 out of 3 blocks the liquidity coefficient 
of issuer firms is higher than that of non-issuer firms.  The results reverse the results for total 
firm investment regressions since non-issuer firms face higher liquidity constraints.   
Now, we switch the discussion back to the set of corporate investments that is the main 
focus of this study i.e. inventory investments.  If the findings of differences in liquidity 
constraints due to bank dependent borrowers are a causal effect of RBI’s policy of instituting a 
cut in the bank loan supply curve than in the prior year, 1995-96 and in the subsequent year, 
1997-98 firms across both categories of same firms as in 1996-97 should face lower liquidity 
constraints.  Table 8 reports the results of the baseline regression specifications and the pure 
bank dependency hypothesis for 1995-96 and 1997-98.  The results from 1995-96 are consistent 
with such an explanation.  Issuer firms and perhaps surprisingly non-issuer firms are not liquidity 
constrained in the baseline and bank dependent regressions and have lower magnitudes of 
liquidity coefficients than the 1996-97 baseline regression liquidity coefficients.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, the interaction term for above bank median debt and liquidity is significant at 5% 
level of confidence for issuer firms while it is not significant for non-issuer firms.  Results from 
1997-98 baseline show higher levels of liquidity constraints for non-issuer firms.  A potential 
explanation for this finding is that perhaps RBI’s policy of 1996-97 and contractionary bank loan 
supply shocks similar to contractionary money supply shocks [See Christiano, Eichenbaum and   43
Evans (1997)] have a spillover effects in 1997-98, which ended up constraining non-issuer firms.   
The differences in liquidity constraints between issuer and non-issuer firms in 1997-98 are 
significant for both baseline and bank dependent regressions.  In sum, the evidence supports the 
causal effect of RBI’s bank loan supply cut increasing liquidity constraints for Indian 
manufacturing firms 
Table 9 reports results of specifications that examine individual components of 
inventories. The differences in investment liquidity sensitivities across non-issuer and issuer 
firms found for aggregate inventories are no longer significant for individual component of 
inventories: raw materials, work-in-process and finished goods specifications.  In addition, the 
coefficients of liquidity for issuer firms are higher in magnitude, though they are not 
significantly different, than those of non-issuer firms for raw material inventories and finished 
goods inventories.  The coefficients for liquidity in work in progress inventories are not 
significant for both sets of firms.  The number of observations for each individual component of 
inventories is lower due to missing data compared to aggregate inventories.  Therefore, 
regressions for matching samples for aggregate inventories are presented.  For work-in-progress 
the seemingly anomalous results of findings of non-significant liquidity constraints and no 
significant difference in liquidity constraints is explained by sample selection bias induced by 
missing data since the matching aggregate inventories regressions also have similar findings.  
The findings for raw materials and finished goods need to be investigated further.     
 
6.     Conclusions 
  
The empirical methodology pioneered by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) has come 
under criticism from Kaplan and Zingales (1997 and 2000) who present theoretical arguments 
and empirical evidence against interpreting differences in investment liquidity sensitivities 
between two sets of firms sorted on an a prior basis of differences in information asymmetries   44
and access to capital markets as liquidity constraints.  We use a comprehensive plan of empirical 
investigation to figure out whether the investment liquidity sensitivities represent liquidity 
constraints?  We use a sorting criterion that provides an unambiguous prediction as to the 
direction of the differences in liquidity constraints in an emerging market where bank financing 
is a major source of capital for firms and in a time period of bank loan supply contraction 
engineered by RBI in India.  Using propensity score regressions that are not subject to the caveat 
(that expectations of future firm profitability or firm characteristics might be different between 
issuer and non-issuer firms such that interpreting differences between inventory investment 
liquidity coefficients as liquidity constraints may not be robust), we find evidence consistent with 
non-issuer firms facing higher liquidity constraints in inventory investments relative to issue 
firms.  We directly test for whether the liquidity constraints are binding or not by examining sub-
samples of firms that had total investments lower than their internal funds and firms that had 
total investments higher than their internal funds.  The differences in inventory investment 
liquidity sensitivities are driven by firms facing a financing gap i.e. firms that had investments 
higher than internal funds.  Results from sub-samples of firms with observed increase in external 
and internal financing cost wedge and firms with no increase in the said wedge are driven by 
firms that face an increase in the wedge between external and internal cost of financing.  Further, 
using the two sets of firms generated by this sorting criterion, we use the empirical strategy of 
investigating how the differences in investment liquidity sensitivities arise by examining various 
financial intermediations based explanations.  The results from examining aggregate inventory 
investments are consistent with non-issuer firms having higher investment liquidity sensitivities 
vis-à-vis issuer firms.  It is characteristics of borrowers i.e. bank dependent non-issuer firms that 
drive the differences in liquidity constraints between the two sets of firms.   Explanations based 
on lender characteristics are not supported.  Next, we examine alternative explanations for 
investment liquidity sensitivities including agency problems, flypaper effect, over-investment, 
non-Indian legal regime based contracting and governance environment, crony capitalism and   45
debt overhang.  None of these alternative hypotheses except debt overhang explain differences in 
investment liquidity sensitivities. Results from debt overhang regressions support the 
interpretation of differences in liquidity coefficients as representing differences in liquidity 
constraints but due to the differences in liquidity demand.  The findings illustrate that even 
unconstrained firms can have a higher propensity to save cash out of liquidity (by inference) if 
they face the fully anticipated prospects of having to redeem a rather large current portion of 
long term debt outstanding in the current and next three years.  These findings add to Almeida et. 
al.’s (2002) results.  The identification  of potentially ‘misclassified’ non-issuer firms as liquidity 
constrained based on their extending inter-corporate loans to other firms during 1996-97 
provides support for Kaplan and Zingales (1998) who note that the final implication of their 
study is that a great deal can be learned about corporate liquidity through direct observations 
(beyond liquidity coefficients).  With that caveat in mind, it is clear that inventory investment 
liquidity sensitivities represent liquidity constraints.     
The picture that emerges from examining capital investments and total firm investments 
is cloudy.  The results from capital investments and total investments regressions support the 
bank dependence hypothesis driving differences in investment liquidity sensitivities.  However, 
results from propensity score regressions that control for differences in mismeasurement of Q 
between issuers and non-issuers present contradictory and ambiguous results.  The matching 
observations findings are consistent with non-issuers facing lower liquidity constraints than 
issuer firms and/or differences in mismeasurement of Q driving the prior documented differences 
in capital and total firm investment liquidity constraints.  The non-matching observations provide 
evidence consistent with firm characteristics and future expectations of profitability being 
different between a set of issuer and non-issuer firms.    
India is an emerging market with bank financing representing a major source of financing 
for firms.  Whether bank dependence is the source of differences in liquidity constraints, if any, 
in samples of firms in developed countries is an unanswered question.  A potential topic for   46
future research is studying sample(s) of firm year observations at the time of monetary policy 
regime shifts and examining alternative explanations for differences in investment liquidity 
sensitivities in order to identify the source(s) of liquidity and financial constraints faced by firms 
in developed countries.   Further empirical tests that directly tie investment liquidity sensitivities 
to their interpretation as liquidity constraints, examination of a comprehensive array of 
alternative hypotheses to explain differences in investment liquidity sensitivities, and conducting 
the two direct empirical hypotheses tests of financing gap and changes in wedge between 
external and internal financing used in this study in other countries and for other samples would 
be useful.                   
The propensity score regression framework and the manner in which it has been used in 
this study have potential implications both narrow and broad. In the narrow sense, for studies 
utilizing FHP (1988) methodology it provides a way to control for differences in firm 
characteristics (in multiple dimensions) that can control for mismeasurement of Q problems that 
arise due to the sorting criterion used to a-priori sort firms into liquidity constrained and non-
liquidity constrained firms.   In the broad sense, the particular manner of use of the propensity 
score method in this study to match firms in multiple dimensions, which builds on prior studies 
like Lalonde (1986), Dehejia and Wahba (1998, 1999) and Villalonga (2000), provides a way to 
construct a ‘better’ set of benchmark control firms.  Two examples illustrate this point.  The 
ability to construct a set of benchmark firms matched on multiple sources of risk characteristics 
using propensity scores might be useful for studies that examine IPO and SEO long-run under-
performance. The ability to construct a set of benchmark firms matched on propensity to be 
taken-over or merged could be useful for studies examining either post-merger performance of 
bidders or merger waves.         
 
 
References   47
Almeida, H. and M. Campello, “Financial Constraints and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities: 
New Research Directions,” Working Paper (2002),  New York University, New York City, NY.  
 
Almeida, H., M. Campello and M. S. Weisbach, “Corporate Demand for Liquidity,” Journal of 
Finance (2002), forthcoming. 
 
Alti, A., “How Sensitive is Investment to Cash Flow When Financing is Frictionless?” Journal of 
Finance (2002), forthcoming.  
 
Annual Report, Reserve Bank of India, (1996-97), New Delhi, India. 
 
Athey, M. J. and P. S. Laumas, “Internal Funds and Corporate Investment in India,” Journal of 
Development Economics, VL (1994), 287-303. 
 
Athey, M. J. and W. D. Reeser, “Asymmetric Information, Industrial Policy, and Corporate 
Investment in India,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, LXII (2000), 267-292. 
 
Banerjee, A. V. and E. Duflo, “Nature of Credit Constraints: Evidence from an Indian Bank,” 
Working Paper (2001), MIT, Cambridge, MA.  
 
Blinder, A. S. and L. J. Maccini, “Taking Stock: A Critical Assessment of Recent Research on 
Inventories,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V (1991), 73-96. 
 
Carpenter, R. E., S. M. Fazzari and B. C. Petersen, “Inventory Investment, Internal-Finance 
Fluctuations, and the Business Cycle,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1994:2, 75-138. 
 
Calomiris, C. W., C. P. Himmelberg and P. Wachtel, “Commercial Paper, Corporate Finance and 
the Business Cycle: A Microeconomic Perspective,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Serving 
Public Policy, (1995), 203-250.  
 
Christiano, L. J., M. Eichenbaum and C. L. Evans, “Monetary Policy Shocks? What have We 
Learned and to What End?” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper (1997), paper no. 
97-18. 
 
Cleary, S., “The Relationship Between Firm Investment and Financial Status,” Journal of 
Finance, LIV (1999), 673-692. 
 
Dehejia, R. H. and S. Wahba, “Propensity score matching methods for non-experimental causal 
studies,” NBER working paper 6829 (1998), Cambridge, MA. 
 
 Dehejia, R. H. and S. Wahba, “Causal effects in non-experimental studies: Re-evaluating the 
evaluation of training programs,” Journal of American Statistical Association, 94 (1998), 1053-
1062. 
 
Diamond, D. W., “Financial Inter-mediation and Delegated Monitoring,” Review of Economic 
Studies CI (1984), 393-414. 
 
Diamond, D. W., “Seniority and the Maturity of Debt Contracts,” Journal of Financial 
Economics XXXIII, (1991), 341-368.  
   48
Erikson, T. and T. M. Whited, “Measurement Error and the Relationship Between Investment 
and Q,” Journal of Political Economy (2000), 1027-1057. 
 
Fama, E. F., “What’s Different About Banks?” Journal of Monetary Economics, XV (1985), 29-
39. 
 
Fazzari, S. M., R. G. Hubbard and B. C. Petersen, “Inventory (Dis)Investment, Internal Finance 
Fluctuations, and the Business Cycle,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1988), 141-195.  
 
Fazzari, S. M., R. G. Hubbard and B. C. Petersen, “Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities are 
Useful: A Comment on Kaplan and Zingales,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXV (2000), 
695-705.     
 
Fafchamps, M., J W. Gunning and R. Oostendorp, “Inventories, Liquidity, and Contractual Risk 
in African Manufacturing,” Working Paper (1997), Stanford University, Stanford, CA.   
 
Galindo, Arturo, Fabio Schiantarelli, and Andrew Weiss, "Does Financial Liberalization 
Improve the Allocation of Investment? Micro Evidence from Developing Countries." Working 
Paper 503 (2002), Boston College, Boston, MA.. 
 
Gibson, M.S., “Can Bank Health Affect Investment? Evidence from Japan,” Journal of Business, 
vol. 68 (1995), 281-308.  
 
Gorton, G. and Pennachhi, G. (1990), “Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation,” Journal 
of Finance, (1990), 49-72. 
 
Guasch J. L. and J. Kogan, “Inventories in Developing Countries: Levels and Determinants, A 
Red Flag on Competitiveness and Growth,” Working Paper (2001), Harvard University, 
Cambridge, MA.   
 
Hennessy, C. A. and Levy A., “A Unified Model of Distorted Investment: Theory and 
Evidence,” Working Paper (2002), University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA. 
 
Hines, J. R. and R. H. Thaler, “Anomalies: The Flypaper Effect,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, IX (1995), 217-226. 
 
Houston, J. F. and James, C. M., “Banking relationships, financial constraints, and investment: 
Are bank dependent borrowers more financially constrained?” Working Paper (1995), University 
of Florida, Gainesville, FL.  
 
Hoshi, T., A. K. Kashyap and D. Scharfstein, “Corporate Structure, Liquidity and Investment: 
Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CVI (1991), 33-60.     
 
Hoshi, T., A. K. Kashyap and D. Scharfstein, “Bank Monitoring and Investment: Evidence from 
Changing Structure of Japanese Corporate Banking Relationships,” NBER working paper 3079 
91989), Cambridge, MA.. 
 
Hubbard, R. G., “Capital Market Imperfections and Investment,” Journal of Economic 
Literature, XXXVI (1998), 193-225. 
   49
Hubbard, R. G., Kuttner K. N. and Palia D. N., “Are There Bank Effects in Borrowers Costs of 
Funds? Evidence From a Matched Sample of Borrowers and Banks,” Journal of Business, vol. 
75(2002), 559-581.  
 
Kadappakam, P. R., P. C. Kumar and L. A. Riddick, “The Impact of Cash Flows and Firm Size 
on Investment: The International Evidence,” Journal of Banking and Finance, XXII (1998), 293-
320.  
 
Kaplan, S. N. and L. Zingales, “Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures 
of Financing Constraints?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXII (1997), 169-215.     
   
Kaplan, S. N. and L. Zingales, “Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Are Not Valid Measures Of 
Financing Constraints?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXV (2000), 707-712.     
 
Kashyap, A. K., O. A. Lamont and J. C. Stein, “Credit Conditions and the Cyclical Behavior of 
Inventories,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CIX (1994), 565-592. 
 
Kashyap, A. K., J. C. Stein and D. W. Wilcox, “Monetary Policy and Credit Conditions: 
Evidence from the Composition of External Finance,” American Economic Review, LXXXIII 
(1993), 79-98.  
 
Kashyap, A. K. and D. W. Wilcox, “Production and Inventory Control at the General Motors 
Corporation During the 1920s and 1930s,” American Economic Review, LXXXIII (1993), 383-
401.  
 
Khanna, T. and K. Palepu, “Emerging market business groups, foreign investors, and corporate 
governance,” NBER working paper 6955 (1999), Cambridge, MA. 
 
Khanna, T. and K. Palepu, “Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets?  An Analysis 
of Diversified Indian Business Groups,” Journal of Finance (2000), 807-837. 
 
Krueger, A. O., “Why Crony Capitalism is Bad for Economic Growth,” Crony Capitalism and 
Economic Growth in Latin America: Theory and Evidence (2001), Ed. S. Haber, Hoover Press, 
Stanford, CA. 
 
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1997. The legal determinants of 
external financing. Journal of Finance 52, 1131-1150. 
 
Lalonde, R. J., 1986, Evaluating the econometric evaluations of training programs with 
experimental data, American Economic Review, 76, pp. 604-620. 
 
Moyen, N., 2002, “Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities: Constrained versus Unconstrained 
Firms,” Journal of Finance, forthcoming.  
 
Narula, S. C. and J. F. Wellington, “The Minimum Sum of Absolute Errors Regression: A State 
of the Art Survey,” International Statistical Review, L (1982), 317-326. 
 
Petersen, M. A. and R. G. Rajan, “Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence,” Review of Financial 
Studies, X (1997), 661-691. 
   50
Petersen, M. A. and R. G. Rajan, “The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence From Small 
Business Data,” Journal of Finance, IL (1994), 3-37. 
 
Poterba, J. M., “Comments and Discussion of Inventory (Dis)Investment, Internal Finance 
Fluctuations, and the Business Cycle,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1988), 200-204.  
 
Prowess User’s Manual, “Data Definitions,” (1997), vol. 2, C.M.I.E., Mumbai, India.  
 
Ramey, V. A. and K. D. West, “Inventories,” NBER working paper 6315 (1997), Cambridge, 
MA. 
 
Report on Currency and Finance, Reserve Bank of India (1997-98), New Delhi, India. 
 
Sandesara, J. C., “Small Scale Industrialization: The Indian Experience,” Economic and Political 
Weekly, XXIII (1988), 640-654.  
 
Stein, J. C, “Agency, Information and Corporate Investment,” NBER working paper 8342 
(2001), Cambridge, MA. 
 
Stiglitz, J. E., “Comments and Discussion of Inventory (Dis)Investment, Internal Finance 
Fluctuations, and the Business Cycle,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1988), 196-199.  
 
Villalonga, B., Does Diversification Cause the “Diversification Discount?” UCLA working 
paper (2000), Los Angeles, CA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   51
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. 
 
Summary statistics on the 1996-97 sample of Indian manufacturing firms.  All mean (median) are in ten million of Rupees (Crore of Rupees) and 
U.S. $1 = 35.50 Rupees approximately.  T-test column shows the t-stat (p-value). Variable definitions are given in Appendix 1. 
 
Variables  Issuer Firms  Non-Issuer Firms  T-test for diff. 
Total Assets  439.569 
(87.23) 
116.559 
(20.420) 
-5.795 
(0.000) 
Sales   391.464 
(92.275) 
71.010 
(17.670) 
-6.515 
(0.000) 
Inventories/Total 
Assets 
0.199 
(0.180) 
0.175 
(0.154) 
-4.489 
(0.000) 
Change in Inventories  6.398 
(0.330) 
0.711 
(0.110) 
-3.649 
(0.000) 
Inventories/Total 
Assets Change 9796 
-0.012 
(-0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
4.296 
(0.000) 
Liquidity/Total 
Assets 
0.201 
(0.198) 
0.155 
(0.150) 
-7.349 
(0.000) 
CAPEX/Total Assets  0.197 
(0.129) 
0.350 
(0.127) 
3.409 
(0.001) 
Total 
Investments/Total 
Assets 
0.487 
(0.426) 
0.617 
(0.404) 
2.787 
(0.005) 
Total 
Borrowings/Total 
Assets 
0.363 
(0.368) 
0.356 
(0.350) 
-0.803 
(0.425) 
Bank Debt/Total 
Assets 
0.166 
(0.155) 
0.163 
(0.140) 
-0.575 
(0.565) 
Trade Credit/Total 
Assets 
0.166 
(0.138) 
0.131 
(0.101) 
-6.762 
(0.000) 
Short-term arm’s 
length debt/Total 
Assets 
0.020 
(0.011) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-28.865 
(0.000) 
Insider’s cash flow 
rights 
31.329 
(32.310) 
29.452 
(28.440) 
-1.698 
(0.089) 
Q 1.216 
(1.037) 
1.048 
(0.927) 
-5.245 
(0.000) 
Salechange9796 0.225 
(0.077) 
2.465 
(0.088) 
0.862 
(0.388) 
Single bank dummy  0.075 
(0.000) 
0.114 
(0.000) 
2.980 
(0.003) 
Below Basle Banking 
Relationships Dummy 
0.158 
(0.000) 
0.080 
(0.000) 
-6.038 
(0.000) 
Above bank limit 
Dummy 
0.186 
(0.000) 
0.264 
(0.000) 
4.273 
(0.000) 
Foreign firm dummy  0.070 
(0.000) 
0.033 
(0.000) 
-3.771 
(0.000) 
Large group firm 
dummy 
0.118 
(0.000) 
0.038 
(0.000) 
-8.009 
(0.000) 
 Operating Margin  0.224 
(0.250) 
0.149 
(0.207) 
-2.908 
(0.004) 
Finance gap/Total 
assets 
-0.004 
(-0.001) 
-0.0132 
(-0.006) 
-4.26 
(0.000) 
Change in external 
wedge 
0.015 
(0.006) 
0.017 
(0.010) 
0.307 
(0.0759) 
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Table 2. 
Baseline regression analysis of Indian manufacturing firms for the year 1996-1997.   The dependent variable in the regressions is the change in the ln of firm inventories over the year.  
Industry dummies are suppressed for brevity of exposition.  Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  Variable definitions are given in Appendix 1. 
 
Variables OLS 
issuer 
firms 
OLS 
Non-
issuer 
firms 
Median 
Issuer 
firms 
Median 
Non-
issuer 
firms 
OLS 
robust 
liquidity 
Issuer 
firms 
OLS 
robust 
liquidity 
Non-
issuer 
firms 
No 
Finance 
gap  
analysis 
issuer 
firms 
No 
Finance 
gap  
analysis 
Non-
issuer 
firms 
Finance 
gap  
analysis 
issuer 
firms 
Finance 
gap  
analysis 
Non-
issuer 
firms 
No 
increase 
in 
external 
wedge  
analysis 
issuer 
firms 
No 
increase 
in 
external 
wedge  
analysis 
non-
issuer 
firms 
Increase 
in 
external 
wedge  
analysis 
issuer 
firms 
Increas
in 
externa
wedge 
analysi
non-
issuer
firms 
Constant 0.247 
(0.183) 
0.243 
(0.235) 
0.322 
(0.185) 
0.222 
(0.170) 
0.239 
(0.183) 
0.253 
(0.235) 
0.123 
(0.411) 
-0.091 
(0.646) 
0.077 
(0.221) 
0.260 
(0.242) 
0.273 
(0.490) 
0.540 
(0.317) 
-0.132 
(0.221) 
0.192 
(0.261)
Group -0.005 
(0.029) 
-0.051 
(0.029) 
-0.032 
(0.033) 
-0.038 
(0.025) 
0.004 
(0.030) 
-0.045 
(0.029) 
0.051 
(0.123) 
0.231 
(0.106) 
-0.017 
(0.029) 
-0.065 
(0.029) 
0.009 
(0.049) 
0.021 
(0.050) 
-0.037 
(0.037) 
-0.092
(0.038)
Ln Inv/Sales  0.007 
(0.024) 
-0.113 
(0.017) 
0.016 
(0.027) 
-0.088 
(0.014) 
0.007 
(0.024) 
-0.115 
(0.017) 
-0.034 
(0.096) 
-0.169 
(0.055) 
-0.033 
(0.025) 
-0.131 
(0.017) 
-0.067 
(0.029) 
0.008 
(0.043) 
-0.038 
(0.030) 
-0.137
(0.021)
Change in Ln 
Sales 
0.399 
(0.046) 
0.294 
(0.031) 
0.289 
(0.052) 
0.232 
(0.025) 
0.399 
(0.047) 
0.296 
(0.031) 
0.078 
(0.171) 
0.169 
(0.113) 
0.387 
(0.047) 
0.302 
(0.030) 
0.373 
(0.048) 
0.199 
(0.088) 
0.455 
(0.064) 
0.249 
(0.042)
Lagged 
change 
in ln sales 
0.002 
(0.041) 
0.020 
(0.017) 
0.033 
(0.046) 
0.016 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.041) 
0.020 
(0.017) 
0.217 
(0.300) 
-0.017 
(0.053) 
-0.061 
(0.038) 
0.037 
(0.017) 
-0.024 
(0.029) 
0.171 
(0.076) 
-0.035 
(0.054) 
0.038 
(0.021)
Lagged 
change in Ln 
Inv. 
-0.281 
(0.038) 
-0.014 
(0.023) 
-0.164 
(0.041) 
0.007 
(0.019) 
-0.284 
(0.038) 
-0.015 
(0.023) 
-0.592 
(0.103) 
0.047 
(0.088) 
-0.146 
(0.039) 
-0.031 
(0.022) 
-0.050 
(0.037) 
-0.382 
(0.061) 
-0.161 
(0.049) 
0.001 
(0.030)
Liquidity  0.496 
(0.139) 
0.545 
(0.105) 
0.220 
(0.153) 
0.461 
(0.085) 
   0.581 
(0.432) 
0.746 
(0.286) 
0.605 
(0.145) 
0.664 
(0.111) 
0.415 
(0.167) 
0.397 
(0.240) 
0.506 
(0.168) 
0.567 
(0.137)
Robust 
Liquidity 
     0.507 
(0.145) 
0.509 
(0.106) 
        
Bank 
debt/Total 
Assets 
-0.028 
(0.156) 
0.034 
(0.112) 
-0.083 
(0.172) 
0.142 
(0.092) 
 
-0.036 
(0.156) 
0.030 
(0.113) 
-0.664 
(0.533) 
0.024 
(0.517) 
0.017 
(0.154) 
-0.057 
(0.107) 
-0.381 
(0.196) 
0.026 
(0.251) 
-0.068 
(0.195) 
0.257 
(0.138)
Trade 
Credit/Total 
Assets 
-0.516 
(0.134) 
-0.331 
(0.109) 
-0.362 
(0.150) 
-0.209 
(0.084) 
-0.518 
(0.135) 
-0.339 
(0.109) 
-0.567 
(0.508) 
-0.709 
(0.526) 
-0.475 
(0.131) 
-0.330 
(0.103) 
-0.384 
(0.168) 
-0.470 
(0.233) 
-0.467 
(0.160) 
-0.353
(0.147)
No. of firms 
Adjusted R
2 
621 
0.233 
1267 
0.174 
621 
0.097 
1267 
0.082 
621 
0.232 
1267 
0.171 
84 
0.427 
163 
0.194 
537 
0.231 
1102 
0.229 
524 
0.185 
253 
0.289 
368 
0.0241 
740 
0.195 
Notes: 
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ OLS:  5.35 (p-value 0.020)   
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ median regression: 10.92 (p-value 0.001)   
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ robust liquidity: 3.77 (p-value0.052)   
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ no financing gap <=0: 1..42 (p-value 0.235) 
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ financing gap > 0: 7.04 (p-value 0.008) 
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ external wedge no-increase <=0: 0.93 (p-value 0.334) 
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ external wedge increase >0 3.91: (p-value 0.048)   
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Table 3.   
Interpretations of liquidity coefficients: Bank dependence, single bank, weak banks, priority lending and bank loan limit explanations. OLS regression analysis of Indian 
manufacturing firms for the year 1996-1997 sorted by issuance of short term arm’s length debt.  The dependent variable in the OLS regressions is the change in the ln of firm inventories over the year.  
Industry dummies are suppressed for brevity of exposition. Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  Variable definitions are given in Appendix 1. 
 
Variables Pure  bank 
dependence 
Issuer 
Firms 
Pure bank 
dependence 
Non-Issuer 
Firms 
Priority 
lending 
Issuer 
firms 
Priority 
lending 
Non-
issuer 
Firms 
Above  
loan 
limit 
issuer 
firms 
Above 
loan 
limit 
Non-
issuer 
firms 
Single 
bank 
Issuer 
Firms 
Single 
bank 
Non-
Issuer 
Firms 
Weak 
banks 
Issuer 
Firms 
Weak 
banks 
non-
issuer 
Firms 
Constant    0.293 
 (0.187)   
  0.295 
 (0.236) 
 0.239 
(0.685) 
 0.222 
(0.249) 
 0.178 
(0.188) 
 0.226 
(0.235) 
 0.227 
(0.184) 
 0.259 
(0.235) 
 0.226 
(0.184) 
0.199 
(0.235) 
Group   -0.004 
 (0.029) 
  -0.510 
 (0.029) 
 -0.014 
 (0.029) 
-0.064 
(0.031) 
-0.008 
(0.030) 
-0.050 
(0.029) 
-0.002 
(0.029) 
-0.050 
(0.030) 
-0.002 
(0.029) 
-0.055 
(0.030) 
Ln Inv/Sales    0.009 
 (0.024) 
  -0.113 
  (0.017)  
 -0.016 
 (0.024) 
-0.117 
(0.018) 
-0.002 
(0.024) 
-0.117 
(0.018) 
 0.008 
(0.024) 
-0.112 
(0.017) 
 0.009 
(0.024) 
-0.116 
(0.018) 
Change in Ln Sales    0.393 
 (0.047) 
  0.289 
  (0.031) 
 0.311 
(0.062) 
 0.294 
(0.033) 
 0.414 
(0.047) 
 0.293 
(0.031) 
 0.393 
(0.046) 
 0.294 
(0.031) 
 0.399 
(0.046) 
 0.295 
(0.031) 
Lagged change in ln 
sales 
  0.004 
 (0.042)  
   0.020 
  (0.17) 
 0.120 
(0.047) 
 0.022 
(0.017) 
 0.003 
(0.041) 
 0.020 
(0.017) 
-0.006 
(0.041) 
 0.020 
(0.017) 
 -0.000 
(0.041) 
 0.018 
(0.017) 
Lagged change in Ln 
Inv. 
 -0.284 
 (0.038) 
  -0.014 
  (0.023) 
-0.257 
(0.038) 
-0.023 
(0.023) 
-0.276 
(0.038) 
-0.015 
(0.023) 
-0.272 
(0.038) 
-0.015 
(0.023) 
-0.285 
(0.038) 
-0.015 
(0.023) 
Liquidity    0.345 
 (0.189)  
   0.370 
  (0.144) 
 0.263 
 (3.29) 
 0.634 
(0.485) 
 0.561 
(0.156) 
 0.475 
(0.114) 
 0.429 
(0.145) 
 0.508 
(0.110) 
 0.641 
(0.160) 
 0.664 
(0.112) 
Above median bank 
debt 
 -0.042 
 (0.069) 
  -0.067 
  (0.049) 
              
Above median bank 
debt*liquidity 
  0.301 
 (0.258) 
   0.331 
  (0.047)  
        
Single  bank            -0.088 
(0.087) 
-0.047 
(0.053) 
  
Single 
bank*liquidity 
            0.764 
(0.404) 
 0.299 
(0.278) 
  
Weak  banks                 0.091 
(0.069) 
 0.115 
(0.055) 
Weak 
banks*liquidity 
          -0.494 
(0.281) 
-0.668 
(0.239) 
Priority  lending    -0.112 
(0.663) 
 0.022 
(0.096) 
      
Priority 
lending*liquidity 
    0.354 
 (3.29) 
-0.052 
(0.495) 
      
Bank  overlimit          0.096 
(0.067) 
-0.020 
(0.048) 
    
Bank 
overlimit*Liquidity 
        -0.110 
(0.328) 
 0.563 
(0.256) 
      54
Bank debt/total 
assets 
 -0.109 
 (0.215) 
  0.067 
 (0.156) 
-0.098 
(0.158) 
 0.035 
(0.121) 
-0.114 
(0.164) 
 -0.019 
 
(0.121) 
-0.025 
(0.156) 
 0.037 
(0.113) 
-0.42 
(0.156) 
0.035 
(0.113) 
Trade credit/total 
assets 
 -0.518 
 (0.134) 
 -0.331 
 (0.109) 
 -0.510 
 (0.138) 
-0.418 
(0.136) 
-0.486 
(0.136) 
-0.318 
(0.110) 
-0.522 
(0.135) 
-0.332 
(0.109) 
-0.503 
(0.135) 
-0.335 
(0.109) 
No. of firms 
Adjusted R
2 
   621 
  0.233 
   1267 
   0.175 
  615 
 0.204 
  1194 
 0.171 
 621 
0.234 
 1267 
 0.177 
  621 
 0.236 
 1267 
 0.174 
  621 
 0.235  
 1267 
 0.178 
 
Notes: 
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ bank dependence:  1.28 (p-value 0.257)   
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ priority lending: 0.26 (p-value 0.609)   
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ bank loan limit: 1.96 (p-value 0.162) 
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ single bank: 3.03 (p-value 0.082)   
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ weak banks: 5.77 (p-value 0.016)  
 
 
 
Table 3b.   
Bank debt allocation efficiency.  Correlation analysis of Indian manufacturing firms for the year 1996-1997 sorted by issuance of short term arm’s length debt.  Kratio1 = Actual average 
product of capital (based on value added) to the hypothetical ‘optimal’ average product of capital.  Kratio2 = Actual average product of capital (based on operating profits) to the hypothetical ‘optimal’ 
average product of capital.  Variable definitions are given in Appendix 1. 
 
Variables Kratio1  Kratio2 
Bank 
debt 
quartile 
1996  
-0.069 -0.066 
Bank 
debt 
change 
quartile 
1996-97 
-0.033 -0.031 
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Table 4.   
Interpretations of liquidity coefficients: Agency problems, Flypaper effect, Over-investment, Non-Indian legal regime, crony capitalism and debt overhang explanations.  OLS 
regression analysis of Indian manufacturing firms for the year 1996-1997 sorted by issuance of short term arm’s length debt.  The dependent variable in the OLS regressions is the change in the ln of 
firm inventories over the year.  Industry dummies are suppressed for brevity of exposition. Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Variable definitions are given in Append. 1. 
 
Variables Agency 
Issuer 
firms 
Agency 
Non-
issuer 
firms 
Flypaper 
Issuer 
firms 
Flypaper 
Non-
issuer 
firms 
Over-
investment 
Issuer 
firms 
Over-
investment 
Non-issuer 
firms 
Non-
Indian 
Issuer 
firms 
Non-
Indian 
Non-
issuer 
firms 
Crony 
Issuer 
firms 
Crony 
Non-
issuer 
firms 
Debt 
overhang 
issuer 
firms 
Debt 
overhand 
non-
issuer 
firms 
Constant 0.325 
(0.185) 
0.196 
(0.236) 
0.223 
(0.182) 
0.145 
(0.238) 
0.218 
(0.185) 
0.271 
(0.234) 
0.241 
(0.183) 
0.223 
(0.234) 
0.227 
(0.185) 
0.221 
(0.234) 
0.124 
(0.174) 
0.146 
(0.212) 
Group -0.001 
(0.030) 
-0.050 
(0.030) 
-0.004 
(0.030) 
-0.049 
(0.029) 
-0.04 
(0.030) 
-0.049 
(0.029) 
-0.006 
(0.030) 
-0.055 
(0.030) 
-0.008 
(0.032) 
-0.034 
(0.031) 
-0.021 
(0.029) 
-0.036 
(0.031) 
Ln Inv/Sales  0.006 
(0.024) 
-0.114 
(0.017) 
0.009 
(0.023) 
-0.113 
(0.017) 
0.008 
(0.024) 
-0.109 
(0.017) 
0.007 
(0.024) 
-0.110 
(0.017) 
0.007 
(0.024) 
-0.113 
(0.017) 
-0.016 
(0.024) 
-0.130 
(0.019) 
Change in Ln 
Sales 
0.388 
(0.046) 
0.294 
(0.031) 
0.389 
(0.046) 
0.291 
(0.031) 
0.392 
(0.047) 
0.289 
(0.031) 
0.398 
(0.046) 
0.290 
(0.031) 
0.399 
(0.047) 
0.290 
(0.030) 
0.271 
(0.063) 
0.293 
(0.036) 
Lagged change 
in ln sales 
-0.005 
(0.041) 
0.022 
(0.017) 
-0.003 
(0.041) 
0.020 
(0.017) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.015 
(0.374) 
0.002 
(0.041) 
0.019 
(0.017) 
0.002 
(0.041) 
0.019 
(0.017) 
0.175 
(0.048) 
0.050 
(0.030) 
Lagged change in 
Ln Inv. 
-0.285 
(0.038) 
-0.014 
(0.023) 
-0.283 
(0.037) 
-0.014 
(0.023) 
-0.284 
(0.038) 
-0.018 
(0.023) 
-0.281 
(0.037) 
-0.015 
(0.023) 
-0.282 
(0.038) 
-0.015 
(0.023) 
-0.250 
(0.037) 
-0.041 
(0.026) 
Liquidity 0.131 
(0.199) 
0.679 
(0.145) 
1.125 
(0.225) 
0.856 
(0.170) 
0.721 
(0.229) 
1.025 
(0.148) 
0.534 
(0.148) 
0.612 
(0.109) 
0.523 
(0.143) 
0.619 
(0.109) 
0.901 
(0.206) 
0.506 
(0.125) 
Below Median 
Ownership 
-0.150 
(0.061) 
0.076 
(0.041) 
                
Below Median 
Ownership 
*Liquidity 
0.653 
(0.259) 
-0.219 
(0.188) 
                
Above median 
industry 
liquidity 
   0.099 
(0.060) 
0.065 
(0.040) 
            
Above median 
industry 
liquidity* 
Liquidity 
   -0.878 
(0.277) 
-0.464 
(0.202) 
            
Above Median 
Operating Margin 
       0.049 
(0.062) 
0.109 
(0.043) 
        
Above Median 
Operating 
Margin*Liquidity 
       -0.328 
(0.276) 
-0.856 
(0.193) 
        
Foreign            0.087 
(0.134) 
0.015 
(0.113) 
      
Foreign* 
Liquidity 
           -0.359 
(0.450) 
-0.685 
(0.384) 
        56
Large group 
Firm 
              0.109 
(0.121) 
0.029 
(0.089) 
  
Large group 
firm* 
Liquidity 
              -0.415 
(0.486) 
-0.752 
(0.319) 
  
Above median 
debt overhang 
               0.164 
(0.061) 
0.055 
(0.044) 
Above median 
debt 
overhang*liquid 
               -0.513 
(0.252) 
-0.083 
(0.195) 
Bank debt/total 
assets 
-0.031 
(0.155) 
0.039 
(0.112) 
-0.039 
(0.156) 
0.027 
(0.112) 
-0.042 
(0.157) 
0.026 
(0.112) 
-0.037 
(0.157) 
0.034 
(0.113) 
 0.023 
(0.112) 
-0.112 
(0.107) 
0.077 
(0.090) 
Trade 
credit/total 
assets 
-0.561 
(0.136) 
-0.350 
(0.109) 
-0.518 
(0.133) 
-0.319 
(0.109) 
-0.528 
(0.136) 
-0.346 
(0.109) 
-0.509 
(0.136) 
-0.304 
(0.109) 
  -0.324 
(0.109) 
-0.436 
(0.131) 
-0.584 
(0.131) 
No. of firms 
Adjusted R
2 
621 
0.239 
1267 
0.175 
621 
0.247 
1267 
0.176 
621 
0.233 
1267 
0.186 
621 
0.232 
1267 
0.177 
621 
0.232 
1267 
0.179 
619 
0.213 
1165 
0.174 
 
Notes: 
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ agency problems:  11.26  (p-value 0.001)   
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ flypaper effect:  1.90 (p-value 0.167)   
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ over-investment: 11.72 (p-value 0.001)   
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ legal origin:  6.50 (p-value 0.010)   
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ crony capitalism: 7.22 (p-value 0.007)   
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ debt overhang: 0.11 (p-value 0.735)     57
 
 
Table 4b.   
Robustness checks on the interpretations of liquidity coefficients: New issuers in 1996-97, ‘misclassified’ non-issuer firms and 
government owned firms explanations.  OLS regression analysis of Indian manufacturing firms for the year 1996-1997 sorted by issuance of 
short term arm’s length debt.  The dependent variable in the OLS regressions is the change in the ln of firm inventories over the year.  Industry 
dummies are suppressed for brevity of exposition. Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  Variable definitions are 
given in Appendix 1. 
Variables New 
1996-97 
issuers 
among 
non-
issuer 
firms 
Rest of 
the 
non-
issuer 
firms 
Misclassified 
Non-issuer 
firms 
Rest of 
the 
non-
issuer 
firms 
Government 
firms 
regressions 
Constant 0.160 
(0.395) 
0.157 
(0.211) 
-0.827 
(0.334) 
0.192 
(0.213) 
0.857 
(0.358) 
Group -0.011 
(0.115) 
-0.041 
(0.030) 
-0.047 
(0.070) 
-0.042 
(0.034) 
 
Ln Inv/Sales  -0.155 
(0.066) 
-0.141 
(0.018) 
-0.118 
(0.043) 
-0.142 
(0.019) 
0.041 
(0.070) 
Change in Ln Sales  0.558 
(0.220) 
0.286 
(0.031) 
0.269 
(0.071) 
0.296 
(0.035) 
-0.352 
(0.289) 
Lagged change in ln sales  -0.043 
(0.189) 
0.063 
(0.029) 
0.119 
(0.069) 
0.038 
(0.032) 
-0.195 
(0.206) 
Lagged change in Ln Inv.  -0.005 
(0.107) 
-0.031 
(0.025) 
0.037 
(0.055) 
-0.054 
(0.028) 
0.427 
(0.163) 
Liquidity  -0.917 
(0.431) 
0.422 
(0.102) 
0.913 
(0.310) 
0.354 
(0.110) 
0.069 
(0.528) 
Bank overlimit           
Bank overlimit*Liquidity           
Bank debt/total assets  0.205 
(0.495) 
0.084 
(0.089) 
-0.288 
(0.222) 
0.135 
(0.097) 
 
Trade credit/total assets  -0.580 
(0.739) 
-0.571 
(0.129) 
-0.992 
(0.305) 
-0.516 
(0.144) 
 
No. of firms 
Adjusted R
2 
48 
0.065 
1211 
0.176 
225 
0.248 
986 
0.169 
88 
0.056 
 
Notes: 
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of  new 1997 issuer firms and rest of non-issuer firms: 7.59 (p-value 0.006)  
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of  misclassified non-issuer firms and rest of non-issuer firms: 0.28 (p-value 0.596)  
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of  government firms and privately owned sample firms: 3.86 (p-value 0.049)   
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Table 5.   
Capital investments and total firm investments       
OLS regression analysis of Indian manufacturing firms for the year 1996-1997 sorted by issuance of short term arm’s length debt.  The dependent 
variable in the OLS regressions above is the ln of capital investments for first 2 models and ln of firm investments for the next 2 models.  Industry 
dummies are suppressed for brevity of exposition.   Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates.   Variable definitions are 
given in Appendix 1. 
 
Variables Capex 
and Q 
Issuer 
firms 
Capex 
and Q 
Non-
issuer 
firms 
Capex and 
bank 
dependent 
Issuer 
firms 
Capex and 
bank 
dependent 
Non-
issuer 
firms 
Total 
and Q 
Issuer 
firms 
Total 
and Q 
Non-
issuer 
firms 
Total and 
bank 
dependent 
Issuer 
firms 
Total and 
bank 
dependent 
Non-ssuer 
firms 
Constant  -1.624 
(0.412) 
-1.633 
(0.512) 
-1.335 
(0.407) 
-1.428 
(0.519) 
-1.594 
(0.224) 
-1.294 
(0.329) 
-1.533 
(0.223) 
-1.216 
(0.332) 
Group 0.053 
(0.085) 
-0.018 
(0.077) 
0.068 
(0.084) 
0.019 
(0.077) 
0.004 
(0.046) 
-0.089 
(0.049) 
0.011 
(0.046) 
-0.080 
(0.049) 
Change in Ln 
sales 
0.349 
(0.125) 
0.463 
(0.070) 
0.335 
(0.123) 
0.466 
(0.070) 
0.361 
(0.067) 
0.303 
(0.045) 
0.347 
(0.067) 
0.296 
(0.045) 
Lagged 
change in Ln 
sales 
0.077 
(0.109) 
0.124 
(0.037) 
0.096 
(0.108) 
0.133 
(0.038) 
0.082 
(0.059) 
0.078 
(0.024) 
0.085 
(0.059) 
0.081 
(0.024) 
Liquidity 0.847 
(0.625) 
1.283 
(0.404) 
-0.717 
(0.563) 
0.032 
(0.373) 
-0.236 
(0.339) 
0.551 
(0.257) 
0.457 
(0.385) 
0.441 
(0.319) 
Q 0.016 
(0.083) 
0.069 
(0.057) 
0.035 
(0.076) 
0.126 
(0.052) 
0.055 
(0.045) 
0.071 
(0.037) 
0.085 
(0.041) 
0.088 
(0.033) 
Above Median 
Q 
0.219 
(0.167) 
0.364 
(0.115) 
   0.028 
(0.090) 
0.073 
(0.073) 
  
Above median 
Q* 
Liquidity 
-1.037 
(0.795) 
-1.040 
(0.541) 
   0.141 
(0.432) 
-0.236 
(0.346) 
  
Above median 
bank debt 
   -0.413 
(0.191) 
-0.174 
(0.125) 
   -0.065 
(0.104) 
0.051 
(0.080) 
Above median 
bank debt* 
Liquidity 
   1.73 
(0.705) 
1.070 
(0.502) 
   0.457 
(0.385) 
0.441 
(0.319) 
Bank 
debt/Total 
assets 
-1.102 
(0.491) 
-0.578 
(0.293) 
-0.883 
(0.704) 
-0.498 
(0.417) 
0.655 
(0.263) 
0.850 
(0.186) 
0.535 
(0.377) 
0.490 
(0.262) 
Trade 
Credit/Total 
assets 
-2.361 
(0.415) 
-1.569 
(0.347) 
-2.36 
(0.412) 
-1.487 
(0.347) 
0.204 
(0.226) 
0.972 
(0.223) 
0.196 
(0.225) 
0.958 
(0.222) 
No. of firms 
Adjusted R
2  
475 
0.127 
1002 
0.146 
475 
0.136 
1002 
0.141 
477 
0.146 
1006 
0.124 
477 
0.147 
1006 
0.129 
 
Notes: 
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ capex and Q:  2.76 (p-value 0.0966)   
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ capex and bank dependent: 2.02 (p-value 0.155)   
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ total and Q:   4.89 (p-value 0.027)   
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ total and bank dependent: 2.39  (p-value 0.122)   
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Table 6.   
Propensity score regressions 
 
OLS regression analysis of Indian manufacturing  firms for the year 1996-1997 sorted by propensity score block i.d. with minimum 15 
observations for issuers and non-issuers in each block.   The dependent variable in the OLS regressions above is the change in the ln of firm 
inventories over the year.  The regression specifications are baseline inventories regressions, baseline capex regressions or baseline total 
investments regressions.  Variable definitions are given in Appendix 1.  
 
Specification Issuer  firms 
liquidity 
coefficient 
Non-issuer firms 
Liquidity 
coefficient 
Observations 
Inventories 
first block  
-2.359 0.130  121 
Inventories 
second block 
0.476 0.046  89 
Inventories 
third block 
1.169 0.440  51 
Inventories 
fourth block 
1.538 1.626  58 
Inventories 
fifth block 
-1.293 1.109 91 
Capex first 
block 
2.923 
 
1.098 155 
Capex second 
block 
2.109 -0.422  123 
Capex third 
block 
-0.966 -2.216  131 
Total 
investments 
first block 
0.657 0.530  155 
Total 
investments 
second block 
1.421 -0.374  123 
Total 
investments 
third block 
-0.626 -1.417  131 
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Table 7.   
Within industry liquidity constraints      
OLS regression analysis of Indian manufacturing  firms for the year 1996-1997 sorted by industries.  The dependent variable in the OLS 
regressions above is the change in the ln of firm inventories over the year.    Variable definitions are given in Appendix 1.  
 
Industry Liquidity  Coefficient  R
2  No. of firms 
Agricultural products  0.508  0.242  50 
Mineral products  1.102  0.163  51 
Fats, Oils and derived 
products 
1.424 0.475  60 
Food products, 
beverage and tobacco 
0.817 0.116  103 
Textiles 0.855  0.194  324 
Pulp and paper 
products 
-0.099 0.472  69 
Chemicals 0.446  0.106  322 
Plastics and rubber  0.712  0.284  161 
Non metallic mineral 
products 
0.295 0.141  104 
Base metals  0.766  0.229  229 
Non electrical 
machinery 
-0.016 0.043  106 
Electrical machinery 
except for electronics 
-0.411 0.126  104 
Electronics -0.956  0.277  108 
Transport equipment  0.864  0.004  39   61
Table 8.   
Pre and post 1996-97 liquidity constraints with same firms as in 1996-97.  
OLS regression analysis of Indian manufacturing firms for the year 1996-1997 sorted by issuance of short term arm’s length debt.  The dependent variable in the OLS regressions is the change in the ln 
of firm inventories over the year.  Industry dummies are suppressed for brevity of exposition. Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1. 
Variables 1995-96 
baseline 
issuer 
firms 
1995-96 
baseline 
non-
issuer 
firms 
1995-96 
bank 
dependent 
issuer 
firms 
1995-96 
bank 
dependent 
non-
issuer 
firms 
1997-98 
baseline 
issuer 
firms 
1997-98 
baseline 
non-
issuer 
firms 
1997-98 
bank 
dependent 
issuer 
firms 
1997-98 
bank 
dependent 
non-
issuer 
firms 
Constant  -0.606 
(0.199) 
0.184 
(0.208) 
-0.547 
(0.199) 
0.214 
(0.210) 
-0.003 
(0.153) 
-0.298 
(0.220) 
-0.076 
(0.152) 
-0.315 
(0.222) 
Group -0.024 
(0.032) 
-0.069 
(0.033) 
-0.023 
(0.032) 
-0.067 
(0.033) 
-0.008 
(0.029) 
-0.014 
(0.030) 
-0.011 
(0.029) 
-0.018 
(0.030) 
Ln Inv/Sales  -0.147 
(0.027) 
-0.151 
(0.023) 
-0.147 
(0.027) 
-0.151 
(0.023) 
-0.053 
(0.021) 
-0.086 
(0.019) 
-0.074 
(0.021) 
-0.106 
(0.018) 
Change in Ln 
Sales 
0.493 
(0.095) 
0.314 
(0.053) 
0.473 
(0.095) 
0.313 
(0.053) 
0.189 
(0.046) 
0.216 
(0.030) 
0.180 
(0.046) 
0.187 
(0.030) 
Lagged 
change in ln 
sales 
0.080 
(0.061) 
0.048 
(0.035) 
0.083 
(0.061) 
0.046 
(0.035) 
0.136 
(0.061) 
0.151 
(0.040) 
0.057 
(0.063) 
0.127 
(0.41) 
Liquidity 0.097 
(0.124) 
0.170 
(0.109) 
-0.091 
(0.148) 
0.078 
(0.137) 
0.483 
(0.136) 
0.753 
(0.107) 
0.284 
(0.171) 
0.494 
(0.140) 
Lagged 
change in Ln 
Inv. 
-0.198 
(0.048) 
-0.110 
(0.032) 
-0.197 
(0.048) 
-0.112 
(0.032) 
-0.097 
(0.042) 
-0.130 
(0.032) 
0.045 
(0.033) 
-0.017 
(0.024) 
Above median 
bank debt 
   -0.069 
(0.079) 
-0.038 
(0.066) 
   -0.084 
(0.059) 
-0.131 
(0.050) 
Above median 
bank debt* 
Liquidity 
   0.560 
(0.242) 
0.228 
(0.201) 
   0.457 
(0.221) 
0.557 
(0.182) 
Bank 
debt/Total 
assets 
-0.010 
(0.121) 
0.051 
(0.105) 
-0.209 
(0.170) 
-0.001 
(0.161) 
-0.085 
(0.111) 
-0.042 
(0.091) 
-0.063 
(0.157) 
0.108 
(0.135) 
Trade 
Credit/Total 
assets 
-0.208 
(0.144) 
-0.361 
(0.146) 
-0.240 
(0.144) 
-0.352 
(0.147) 
-0.103 
(0.140) 
-0.564 
(0.119) 
-0.077 
(0.142) 
-0.629 
(0.120) 
No. of firms 
Adjusted R
2  
547 
0.137 
812 
0.148 
547 
0.148 
812 
0.147 
622 
0.172 
1103 
0.231 
621 
0.1711 
1100 
0.224 
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ 1995-96 baseline: 1.87 (p-value 0.172)   
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ 1995-96 bank dependent: 1.43 (p-value 0.233) 
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ 1997-98 baseline: 15.3 (p-value 0.000)   
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ 1997-98 bank dependent: 3.84 (p-value 0.05)  
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Table 9.   
Components of Inventories: Raw Materials, Work-In-Process and Finished Goods.      
OLS regression analysis of Indian manufacturing firms for the year 1996-1997 sorted by issuance of short term arm’s length debt.  The dependent variable in the OLS regressions is the change in the ln 
of firm inventories over the year.  Industry dummies are suppressed for brevity of exposition. Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1. 
Variables RAW 
issuer 
firms 
RAW 
non-
issuer 
firms 
Matching 
inv. 
issuer 
firms 
Matching 
inv. 
non-
issuer 
firms 
WIP 
issuer 
firms 
WIP 
non-
issuer 
firms 
Matching 
inv. 
issuer 
firms 
Matching 
inv. 
non-
issuer 
firms 
Fgoods 
issuer 
firms 
Fgoods 
non-
issuer 
firms 
Matching 
inv. 
issuer 
firms 
Matching 
inv. 
non-
issuer 
firms 
Constant   0.340 
(0.357) 
0.070 
(0.371) 
 0.200 
(0.245) 
 0.396 
(0.241) 
-0.263 
(0.312) 
 0.561 
(0.413) 
 0.035 
(0.186) 
 0.427 
(0.239) 
 0.151 
(0.408) 
0.067 
(0.436) 
 0.297 
(0.253) 
 0.462 
(0.257) 
Group   0.034 
(0.40) 
-0.067 
(0.040) 
 -0.031 
(0.028) 
-0.048 
(0.028) 
-0.065 
(0.052) 
-0.064 
(0.052) 
 -0.044 
 (0.029) 
 -0.027 
(0.030) 
 -0.014 
 
(0.047) 
-0.123 
(0.050) 
-0.003 
(0.029) 
-0.062 
(0.029) 
Ln Component 
Inv./Sales 
-0.040 
(0.026) 
-0.138 
(0.019) 
-0.045 
(0.025) 
-0.115 
(0.017) 
-0.115 
(0.024) 
-0.118 
(0.020) 
 -0.034 
 (0.025) 
-0.136 
(0.020) 
 -0.148 
 
(0.024) 
-0.192 
(0.020) 
-0.026 
(0.025) 
-0.071 
(0.017) 
Change in 
Ln. Sales 
 0.361 
(0.075) 
 0.377 
(0.047) 
 
 0.227 
(0.055) 
 0.269 
(0.031) 
 0.121 
(0.101) 
 0.279 
(0.058) 
 0.191 
(0.057) 
 0.259 
(0.036) 
  0.193 
 
(0.092) 
 0.319 
(0.053) 
 0.230 
(0.058) 
 
 0.260 
(0.032) 
Lagged 
Change in 
Ln. Sales 
 0.087 
(0.062) 
 0.021 
(0.024) 
 0.047 
(0.043) 
 0.041 
(0.016) 
 0.057 
(0.086) 
 0.145 
(0.037) 
 
  0.076 
 (0.048) 
 0.034 
(0.022) 
 0.111 
(0.073) 
 0.082 
(0.031) 
 0.105 
(0.045) 
 0.048 
(0.018) 
Lagged 
Change in 
Inv. 
Component 
-0.220 
(0.039) 
-0.115 
(0.024) 
 -0.128 
 (0.040) 
 -0.051 
 (0.023) 
-0.160 
(0.047) 
-0.265 
(0.030) 
 -0.134 
 (0.044) 
 -0.055 
 (0.030) 
  
-0.151 
(0.039) 
-0.179 
(0.029) 
-0.283 
(0.040) 
-0.029 
(0.027) 
Liquidity   0.870 
(0.194) 
 0.545 
(0.146) 
 0.525 
(0.137) 
 0.502 
(0.099) 
 0.336 
(0.258) 
 0.335 
(0.190) 
 0.514 
(0.145) 
 0.362 
(0.114) 
 0.532 
(0.225) 
 0.187 
(0.173) 
 0.620 
(0.142) 
 0.623 
(0.104) 
Bank 
debt/Total 
assets 
 0.197 
(0.211) 
 
-0.011 
(0.162) 
 0.033 
(0.148) 
 0.019 
(0.106) 
 0.385 
(0.270) 
-0.312 
(0.213) 
 0.101 
(0.151) 
-0.079 
(0.125) 
 0.025 
(0.244) 
 0.441 
(0.191) 
 0.030 
(0.155) 
 0.033 
(0.113) 
Trade 
credit/Total 
assets 
-0.511 
(0.185) 
-0.396 
(0.156) 
 -0.442 
 (0.129) 
-0.425 
(0.100) 
-0.789 
(0.246) 
-0.482 
(0.191) 
 -0.485 
 (0.136) 
 -0.435 
 (0.111) 
-0.355 
(0.212) 
-0.397 
(0.181) 
-0.457 
(0.133) 
 -0.254 
(0.107) 
No. of firms 
 Adjusted R
2  
  595 
 0.166 
 1182 
0.154 
  595 
 0.144 
 1182 
0.187 
 540 
0.098 
  874 
 0.193 
 
  540 
 0.138 
  874 
 0.181 
 
  604 
 0.200 
 1176 
 0.179 
 604 
0.207 
 
 1176 
 0.180 
 
Notes: 
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ Raw materials: 0.31  (p-value 0.579) 
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ matching firms inventories: 3.96  (p-value 0.046) 
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ work-in-progress: 0.94 (p-value 0.334)   
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ matching firms inventories: 0.88 (p value:0.348) 
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ 1997-98 finished goods: 0.09  (p-value 0.766 )   
F-test for equality of liquidity coefficients of issuer and non-issuer firms’ matching firms inventories: 6.09 (p-value 0.013)63 
 
Appendix 1.  Variable definitions.   
All log transformations used in regressions are natural logs. 
 
Total Assets: Total firm assets as on March 31, 1996. 
 
Sales: Total firm sales variable over the period April 1, 1995 to March 31, 1996. 
 
Change in Sales: (Total firm sales variable over the period April 1, 1996 to March 31, 1997  
minus total firm sales variable over the period April 1, 1995 to March 31, 1996) divided by total  
firm sales variable over the period April 1, 1995 to March 31, 1996. 
 
Inventories/Total Assets: Aggregate Inventories minus stocks & spares as on April 1, 1996  
scaled by total assets as on April 1, 1996 i.e. inventories=raw materials + work-in- 
process + finished goods. 
 
Change in Inventories = Inventories (as defined above) as on April 1, 1997 minus  
inventories as on April 1, 1996.  
 
Change in Inventories/Total Assets = Inventories (as defined above) divided by total assets as on  
April 1, 1996 minus inventories (as defined above) divided by total assets as on April 1, 1996.  
 
Lagged Change in Inventories = Inventories (as defined above) as on April 1, 1996 minus  
inventories as on April 1, 1995. 
 
[Inventory component terms i.e. raw material inventories, work-in-process and finished goods are 
correspondingly defined]. 
 
Liquidity: Marketable securities plus cash and bank balances as on April 1, 1996 plus earnings before 
interest, depreciation and taxes for the period April 1, 1996 to March 31, 1997.scaled by total assets as on 
April 1, 1996.    
 
Robust liquidity=Liquidity minus marketable securities invested in group firms by peer group firms as on 
April 1, 1996 scaled by total assets as on April 1, 1996. 
 
Capital Investment/Total Assets: (Net fixed assets as on March 31, 1997 minus net fixed  
assets as on March 31, 1996 plus depreciation over the period April 1,1996 to March 31,  
1997-revaluation of fixed assets as on March 31, 1997) scaled by total assets as on April 1,  
1996.   
 
Research & Development Expenditure: Research & development current expenditures over   
the period April 1, 1996 to March 31, 1997 plus research & development capital  
expenditures over the period April 1, 1996 to March 31, 1997.  Indian firms split their annual research & 
development expenditures into current and capital expenditures.   
   
Advertising Expenditures: Advertising expenditures over the period April 1, 1996 to March  
31,1997. 
 
Total Investments/Total Assets: (Capital investments plus inventories plus research   
Expenditures plus advertising expenditures) scaled by total assets as on April 1, 1996. 
 
Total Borrowings/Total Assets:  Total borrowings debt as on March 31, 1996 scaled by total assets as on 
April 1,1996.     
 
Bank Debt/Total Assets: Total bank debt as on April 1, 1996 scaled by total assets as on  
April 1, 1996.       64
 
Short-Term Arm’s Length Debt/Total Assets: (Commercial paper plus short-term fixed deposits as on April 
1, 1996) scaled by total assets as on April 1, 1996. 
 
Short-Term Arm’s Length Debt Dummy: Dummy variable equal to 1 if short-term arm’s length debt 
outstanding and 0 otherwise.   
 
 Trade Credit/Total Assets: Accounts payable as on April 1, 1996 scaled by total assets as  
 on April 1, 1996.  
 
 Operating Margin: Sales minus cost of goods sold as on April 1, 1996 scaled by total assets as on April 1, 
1996. 
 
Finance gap: Liquidity as on March 31, 1997 – total investments over the period April 1, 1996 to March 31, 
1997. 
 
Change in External Internal Finance Wedge: (Interest expense for the period April 1, 1996 to March 31, 
1997 scaled by average of total borrowings as on April 1, 1996 and total borrowings as on March 31, 1997) 
minus (Interest expense for the period April 1, 1995 to March 31, 1996 scaled by average of total 
borrowings as on April 1, 1995 and total borrowings as on March 31, 1996).  
 
 Insider’s cash flow rights:  Equity ownership in percentage terms of board of directors.  
 
Single bank dummy: Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm has a single banking relationship    
 and 0 otherwise.    
   
Weak banks/below Basle banking relationship dummy: Dummy equal to 1 if firms has main banking 
relationship with bank with below 8 percent capital adequacy ratio and 0 otherwise. 
 
Above bank loan limits dummy: Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm has bank debt above the maximum 
prescribed by the bank loan limit rules and 0 otherwise. 
 
Foreign firm dummy: Dummy equal to 1 if firm is a foreign controlled firm listed on Indian stock exchange 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
Group Dummy: Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is part of a business group and 0   
otherwise. 
 
Large group dummy: Dummy variables equal to 1 if firm is part of a business group with more than 17 
firms and 0 otherwise. 
 
Above Median Bank Debt Dummy: Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm has above sample  
median bank debt/total assets. 
 
Above Median Industry Adjusted Liquidity Dummy: Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm  
has above sample median industry adjusted liquidity/total assets and 0 otherwise. 
  
 Below Median Insider’s Cash Flow Rights Dummy: Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm has    
 below sample median insider’s cash flow rights and 0 otherwise.   
 
Priority lending dummy: Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm has equity capital plus free reserves (i.e. net 
worth) as on April 1, 1996 equal to or below 10 million rupees and 0 otherwise.          
 
  Q = (Market value of equity as on the nearest day to April 1, 1996 available plus total    
  assets as on April 1, 1996 minus book value of equity as on April 1, 1996) scaled by  
  total assets as on April 1, 1996.   65
 
 Above median Q dummy = Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm has above sample median Q  
 and 0 otherwise. 
 
Debt overhang = (Current portion of long term debt due in 1996-97 + current portion of long-term  
debt due in 1997-98 +  current portion of long term debt due in 1998-99 + current portion of long- 
term debt due in 1999-00) / Total assets in 1996-97.   
 
Above median debt overhang dummy= Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has above median  
debt overhang. 
 
Age of the firm = 1996 – incorporation year of the firm. 
 
Net profit = Profit after tax from April 1, 1996 to March 31, 1997 divided by total assets as on  
April 1 1996.   
 
Kratio 1 = Actual value added on capital employed divided by hypothetical value added on capital  
employed  (if it was allocated according to current firm’s share of capital stock among issuers or  
non-issuers)      
 
Kratio 2 = Actual operating profit to capital employed divided by hypothetical operating profit to  
capital employed  (if it was allocated according to current firm’s share of capital stock among  
issuers or non-issuers)      
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Appendix 2. Research hypotheses tested. 
 
Table 1 a. Baseline hypotheses 
 
Baseline Hypotheses  Absolute liquidity 
constraints: External –
Internal Wedge  
Relative differences in 
liquidity constraints 
Baseline hypothesis  H0 = βLiquidity= 0 for both 
sets of firms  
HA = βLiquidity > 0 for both 
sets of firms 
 
H0 = βLiquidity (non-issuer 
firms) ≤ βLiquidity (issuer 
firms)    
HA = βLiquidity  (non-issuer 
firms) > βLiquidity  (issuer 
firms)  
No finance gap firms 
hypothesis 
H0 = βLiquidity= 0 for both 
sets of no finance gap 
firms  
HA = βLiquidity > 0 for both 
sets of no finance gap 
firms 
 
No relative differences 
hypothesized 
Finance gap firms 
hypothesis 
H0 = βLiquidity= 0 for both 
sets of finance gap 
firms  
HA = βLiquidity > 0 for both 
sets of finance gap 
firms 
 
H0 = βLiquidity (non-issuer 
finance gap firms) ≤ 
βLiquidity (issuer firms)    
HA = βLiquidity  (non-issuer 
finance gap firms) > 
βLiquidity  (issuer firms) 
No increase in external 
internal wedge 
hypothesis 
H0 = βLiquidity= 0 for both 
sets of no increased 
wedge firms  
HA = βLiquidity > 0 for both 
sets of no increased 
wedge  firms 
 
No relative differences 
hypothesized 
Increase in external 
internal wedge 
hypothesis 
H0 = βLiquidity= 0 for both 
sets of  increased wedge 
firms  
HA = βLiquidity > 0 for both 
sets of  increased wedge 
firms 
 
H0 = βLiquidity (non-issuer 
increased wedge firms) ≤ 
βLiquidity (issuer firms)    
HA = βLiquidity  (non-issuer 
increased wedge firms) > 
βLiquidity  (issuer firms) 
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Table 1 b. Interaction terms based hypotheses 
 
 
Interaction terms based 
hypotheses 
Interaction term 
definition 
Interaction term 
explaining relative 
differences in liquidity 
constraints 
 
1. Pure bank dependency 
hypothesis 
 
 
2. Weak banks hypothesis 
 
 
 
3. Above bank loan limit 
hypothesis 
 
 
4. Priority lending 
hypothesis 
 
 
 
5. Single bank 
hypothesis 
 
 
6. Agency problems 
hypothesis 
 
 
 
7.Flypaper Effect 
hypothesis 
 
 
8.Over-investment 
hypothesis 
 
 
9. Non-Indian legal 
regime parent firm 
hypothesis 
 
10. Crony Capitalism 
hypothesis 
 
 
11. Debt Overhang 
hypothesis 
 
 
 
 
 
1.Liquidity*Above Median 
Bank Debt Dummy 
 
 
2.Liquidity*Below Basle 
capital standards bank 
dummy 
 
3.Liquidity*above 
bank(s) loan limit 
borrowing firm dummy 
 
4.Liquidity*Below 10 
million net worth firm 
dummy 
 
 
5.Liquidity*Single bank 
dummy 
 
 
6.Liquidity*below median 
insider cash flow rights 
ownership dummy 
 
 
7.Liquidity*Above 
industry adjusted 
liquidity dummy 
 
8.Liquidity*Above median 
operating margin dummy 
 
 
9.Liquidity*Foreign firm 
dummy 
 
 
10.Liquidity*Firm 
belonging to a large 
Indian business group 
 
11. Liquidity*Firm 
having above median debt 
overhand dummy 
 
H0 = βliquidity*hypothesis dummy = 
0 for both sets of firms 
or βliquidity*hypothesis dummy 
(non-issuer firms) ≤ 
βliquidity*hypothesis dummy 
(issuer firms) 
HA = βliquidity*hypothesis dummy > 
0 for non-issuer firms 
And βliquidity*hypothesis dummy 
(non-issuer firms) > 
βliquidity*hypothesis dummy 
(issuer firms). After 
controlling for the 
interaction effect,  
  βLiquidity (non-issuer 
firms)= βLiquidity (issuer 
firms) 
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Table 1 c. Capex and Total Investments hypotheses 
 
 
Interaction terms based 
hypotheses 
Interaction term 
definition 
Interaction term 
explaining relative 
differences in liquidity 
constraints 
 
1.Over-investment 
hypothesis 
 
 
2. Pure bank dependency 
hypothesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.Liquidity*Above median 
Q dummy 
 
 
1.Liquidity*Above Median 
Bank Debt Dummy 
 
 
 
H0 = βliquidity*hypothesis dummy = 
0 for both sets of firms 
or βliquidity*hypothesis dummy 
(non-issuer firms) ≤ 
βliquidity*hypothesis dummy 
(issuer firms) 
HA = βliquidity*hypothesis dummy > 
0 for non-issuer firms 
And βliquidity*hypothesis dummy 
(non-issuer firms) > 
βliquidity*hypothesis dummy 
(issuer firms). After 
controlling for the 
interaction effect,  
  βLiquidity (non-issuer 
firms)= βLiquidity (issuer 
firms) 
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